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
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CONTENTS

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[The following are translations of selected articles from the Russian-language monthly journal VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL published in Moscow. Refer to the table of contents for a listing of any articles not translated.]

THE WRITER'S TRIBUNE

Army and Culture [Karem Rash; pp 3-13] 1

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION LIFTED

From Positions of Strength and Threats [B.A. Omelichev; pp 14-29] 8

VIEWPOINTS, JUDGMENTS, VERSIONS

Early Days of Soviet Defense Ministry Described [N.A. Molodtsygin; pp 46-62] 21

"It Is Impossible to Build an Army Without Repression..." L. Trotsky
[A.Ya. Ponomarev; pp 46-62] 30

SCIENTIFIC PAPERS AND INFORMATION

Activities of Russian Army Historical Archives Described [A.V. Korotkov; pp 72-74] 37

Fiftieth Anniversary of VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL Celebrated [pp 94-96] 39

Articles Not Translated from VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL No 8, 1989 42

Publication Data 42

MILITARY HISTORY JOURNAL

No 8, August 1989

THE WRITER'S TRIBUNE

Army and Culture

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pp 3-13

[Article by Karem Rash: "Army and Culture"; continuation, for previous installments see VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL, Nos 2, 3, 4, 5, 7, 1989]

[Text] At one time, in Turgenev's tale "First Love," a young princess proposes to the guests that "in order to clear the air" they read the verses of Pushkin. Let us also resort to this magical rite and try with Pushkin's spirit to see our way clear in these current difficult times.

"Aleksandr Sergeyevich, Aleksandr Sergeyevich [Pushkin], I am but one, but one, but when I look at you it seems to me that I am a million. That is what you can do!" was the exclamation of the student of Greek philology given in the memoirs of Mikhail Pogodin. He also wrote: "In Odessa, Pushkin never missed matins holy Sunday and always urged his comrades to 'listen to the voice of the Russian people' and for which he himself had an absolute ear."

There is something mysterious in the fact that this occurred in Odessa linked with Suvorov, in the capital of Novorossiysk Kray and blessed with the names of Mendeleyev, Ushinskiy, Chaikovskiy and Pirogov. Pogodin also described an event related to him by Gogol: "Around Odessa, there was positioned a battery company with cannons placed on the field. Pushkin, walking outside the town, went up to them and began to carefully look at one after another. An officer found his interest suspicious and he stopped him with a question of his name. 'Pushkin,' he replied. 'Pushkin!' exclaimed the officer.

"Fellows, fire!" and he commanded a ceremonial volley.

The officers ran up and asked the reason for such an unusual firing.

"In honor of a famous guest," replied the officer. "Here, gentlemen, is Pushkin!"

The young fellows seized Pushkin by the arm and led him in triumph to their tents to celebrate the unexpected visit.

"This officer," said Pogodin, "was Grigoryev who afterwards entered a monastery and while in the monastery became acquainted with me, arriving from his Optina wilderness in Moscow for publishing various edifying books of which he was very fond."

Incidentally, somewhat later the graduate of the Cadet School, Capt Lev Aleksandrovich Kavelin, returned to this same Optina wilderness and the Archimandrite Kavelin was to spend the last 14 years of his life as the abbot of the main Russian holy place, Troitse-Sergiyevskaya Monastery, the very one which transformed the nation spiritually and raised it to fight against the Horde. And from this cloister the fighting monks Peresvet and Oslabya would leave for the Kulikovo Field. Archimandrite Kavelin was to become a corresponding member of the Imperial Academy of Sciences and amaze his contemporaries with the breadth and profundity of his works. His last work about the ascetics of the fatherland under the title of "Svyataya Rus" [Holy Russia] was to become the legacy of the former captain to his successors. Neither Pushkin nor Kavelin with all their breadth and sensitivity and in their terrible dream would foresee that their compatriot S. Averintsev would assert that "holy Russia" was a worldwide concept. V. Solovyev also loved the Russians but, as he cynically stated, for their "national self-abnegation" they would be forced to fertilize his clever worldwide idea with themselves. And the Trotskyites endeavored to instill this harmful universality with the aid of punitive measures. This is all the same parasitic idea of forcing other peoples to serve as the material and means for paranoid global plans. There is not a single people which to one degree or another does not possess universal sympathy. But each people can contribute spiritual values to the treasurehouse of mankind when it creates its own homeland and bills its own home country and family.

The time of satanic universality is over. The Gulag drove a wooden stake into the idea of an ambiguous planetary system. The unity lies solely in national diversity and the nobility of principles.

A rootedness in Russian life was the main trait of the poet. Over the years this was more and more strongly manifested:

Two feelings are marvelously close to us—
In them the heart gains succor;
Love for the home hearth,
Love for the paternal graves....

The last verses of the poet were full of monastic simplicity and apostolic wisdom. How many literary persons have measured themselves against the poet. They have appropriated him ("my poet"), they have become familiar with him, even such refined ones such as Blok. Not to mention the vulgar ones who, in "consorting" with him, defile Pushkin. And the smaller the literary figures were the more unceremoniously they dealt with him. They themselves were elevated to the "Silver Age" of Russian poetry on the eve of the fatal year of 1914. They were the movement of decadence. The decadent waning affected airs which did not provide a single quatrain in the children's primer boastfully proclaimed the "Silver Age." Now they call this "self-elevation." Secretly they hated Pushkin and for this reason they

thought up the idea that he was supposedly killed by the heir of the reign of Nikolay. It was a trick of pygmies. If we turn over the sheet of paper on which are Pushkin's famous lines "It is time, my friend, it is time..." on the backside we will read a legacy for us and a key to the entire life of the poet who had gone through the French malaise and the imported decline to the saving acceptance of his home roots. This is what he wrote not long before the fight on the Black Stream: "Soon will I move my hearth to the village, the fields, the orchard, the peasants, books, poetic works, family, love, religion and death."

There is not a word to be added to this legacy of the greatest of our "bumpkins." He intended to live a long time, his lineage was strong and he was full of life. He had produced flourishing and vital offspring. His health was like a rock. Who knows, would he have not outlived all the other graduates of the lycee and would he not have been the last who celebrated the lycee anniversary and spoke the last wonderful words.

Pushkin was moving back to the village forever, back to his roots.

He was on his way to a long and moderate wise life.

What would he have done in our times?

The same that he did then, he would have left the capital directly.

He would have returned to the countryside, far from the asphalt desert and the tacky apartment blocks where the literary hacks sit conjuring up their clever nonsense.

During his life, he traveled a great deal and dreamed about foreign countries. But today, I am convinced, he would never have gone outside Russia. He would have been unable to look the foreigners in the eyes. How could he leave, go away, how could he speak with others abroad? All my life I have not been able to understand, although, I do not condemn others, and I still cannot understand today how it is possible to go abroad on a tourist trip, to a symposium or to even a conference to talk shop and look foreigners in the eye when behind us in our homeland in the Russian forests about a million of our sisters, brothers and fathers have lain unburied since the time of the war. How is it possible to run through foreign stores or relish the shortcomings in our own nation for which we bear personal responsibility when millions of orphans with their mothers alive cry in their pillows at night? The tongue is struck dumb. Shame prevents one from lifting one's eyes when you think about what has been left behind.

But take a look and you are petrified.

The director of the regional museum in Vladivostok, Sushkov, previously a colonel, described to me that at their old officer cemetery, where officers are buried who died in the Russo-Japanese War, a church had been built. In our days, a boarding school for mentally retarded children had been moved into this church. The

children wandered through the cemetery, they dug into the vaults, they exhumed from the graves orders, buckles, daggers, and buttons from the uniforms and amused themselves as if they were wonders. Sushkov broke off this brief story. It was hard for him to speak. But he did not say a word of condemnation against anyone. Are we not reminiscent of these unhappy children? Where they not depicting us? Were they not imitating our television?

Sooner or later, everyone must pay for a lie. Those who most of all condemned the system were the first to be elected to the Supreme Soviet, having sided with the informal wimps for help. The person who most recently condemned the Academy of Pedagogical Sciences most fiercely was the first to rush to submit a request to join as member of this academy. The Supreme Soviet had not even met and on 3 May 1989, in LITERATURNAYA GAZETA, a people's deputy made a brave request of the minister of defense over the question of the loss of one of our submarines. They say that he was an economist. I personally know many economists who have made a career for themselves in publishing in a scholarly language discoveries about the fact that there is no meat in our stores that the lines are a bad thing, that to purchase grain overseas is an indication of poor farming and so forth. But the question of the economist deputy shows that in our political culture the state of affairs is worse than even in that science which he represents. The question was terse but it contained much provincial self-importance, undue familiarity and comic semi-Russian turns of phrase. The impression was created that the author could not master his bursting pride with his new role as a deputy and wanted to notify everyone that he was already elected and was making things hot for these "bureaucrats." But why did the economist ask the question via LITERATURNAYA GAZETA? Why not in parliament in front of the deputies? And why did he turn to the minister of defense and candidate member of the Politburo as if it were some guilty toady? Was there an editor on duty when this unworthy outburst was made?

When writers are counting on mutual gain, both literature and the reader suffer. Those who sow bitterness with a comfortable life do not have any historical future. Their time is over. When the simple people, that is, those who sow, cast steel, drive vehicles and serve the fatherland in garrisons and on the frontier, those who cure, build roads and carry their burden on all levels of the rayon organization speak respectively about Stalin, this is in no way a longing for the whip, the camp or the rebuke. This is the old Russian longing for a master and for order. The people believed in Stalin because in them, in the people, there was still a great deal of idealism and possibly mental health. The cult bespeaks not only the weakness of the people's political thinking, and this is quite correct, but also the magnanimity and strength of this very same people. There was a cult of Khrushchev and Brezhnev, they say. This is nonsense. There was an attempt to repeat the cult. But what of it? Was it a

success? The people did not respond. They could not be deceived. They remembered that the only thing remaining from Stalin who ruled without restraint over all the riches of a good half of the world was just a military greatcoat. I grew up in a family with an absolute hate for Stalin. It reached the point that his name was never even said aloud. But there were people who believed in Stalin just as children, even those abandoned in childhood, believe in the nobility of their parents—so strong in the child is a belief in good in the world. He breathes and lives by this belief. There certainly are people who would like to maintain the economic and state mechanism by the Stalinist method of fear. But another category wants to heap on Stalin all the blame for the errors and crimes in order to whitewash the creators of the Gulag—these secret and outright followers of Trotsky—the most ungifted, most cowardly and bloodiest being which has ever roamed the territory of Russia. For there is no genius without good, just as there is nothing more feeble than violence in the world. All his [Trotsky's] energy was fed by a panic concern, a never abating alarm and hence the idea of permanent destruction. From a feeling of his own failure, he called everyone a hack and was in a numbing and frantic war with everyone. A man who should have been an administrator of Goskontsert [State Concert Management] became the chairman of the Russian RVS [Revolutionary Military Council]. From Germany in the 1930s, we already know how it is possible to stir up the crowd which with violent ecstasy greets anyone, even Smerdyakov in a service coat, if he has a smart phrase at the ready. In the Crimea, Pyatakov executed with machine guns at night thousands of young men, junkers, graduates of the gymnasium, cadets, officers, all who after the Crimea had been occupied by the Reds believed the promises of his "troyka" [a three-man leadership group] about amnesty and voluntarily came over to Soviet power. Bukharin glorified execution as a method of communist indoctrination and himself became a victim of this method. The blood of innocent peasants, children, Cossacks and millions of unprotected persons lies on all this nomenklatura. They were all extraordinary scribblers. They were concerned with titles and collected works. The world had never seen such writing revolutionaries in the Puritan times and with the meager Bolshevik ration. They wanted to get rid of Koba [Stalin]. But Koba got rid of them. But then came the time of Koba himself.... Even a superficial glance is enough to see that after 1933, Stalin's actions in strengthening his power became particularly decisive, consistent and even bold. In Germany a new force had come to power, Nazism. Hitler had become chancellor. Who would oppose him in the camp of socialism and in Russia? Who would be able to conduct unnoticed, hard and sleepless work in strengthening and resurrecting a new state? Who, in skipping ahead, would be able to save the world from the camps and gas ovens? Who would remain on the bridge? Stalin or Trotsky? Stalin or Kamanev? Stalin or Bukharin; Stalin or Tukhachevskiy? The most insightful and principled of all was the representative of the European liberal community Feuchtwanger, a writer

free of narrow party passions. Feuchtwanger confirmed that only Stalin could. He simply condemned the accused in the press. It was not a time to be sentimental. All the main weapons systems were developed after 1937 when Stalin personally became involved in this and dedicated virtually 24 hours a day to steel, weapons and motors, going into all the details. No one now should hinder this man who was to oppose Hitler. For this reason, after 1933, the days and years of the Trotskys, Kamanevs and Bukharins were numbered.

What happened subsequently is known to all. The founders of the Gulag were repressed and from 1939 the star of Zhukov was in ascendance and this outshone even Stalin's in terms of the popular renown of a truly people's military leader. He, in essence, would win the war, defend Moscow, encircle the Germans in Stalingrad and take Berlin. Zhukov would remove Beriia and in 1957, saved Khrushchev and dealt the last blow against the Stalinists of Kaganovich, Molotov and Malenkov. All that we have today, we, to a certain degree, owe to one man, Georgiy Zhukov. And so again the Russian military at a time of crisis was the saviour of the fatherland.

He deserved a monument just where he received the Victory Parade and he should stand on Red Square on a stead near that place where another military leader Dmitriy Pozharskiy in honor of the victory of 1612 erected Kazan Cathedral and on the site of which the founders of the Gulag set up a holding area. The phenomenon of Zhukov in history can be compared with the appearance of the siege regiment on the Kulikovo Field after which, as the chronicles say, "it ceased to be the time of the Tatars and the time of the Russians had come."

Zhukov was not only the greatest general of all times, Zhukov was a phenomenon, a symbol of the people, the idea of the millennium. Zhukov was already the man of the new Russian millennium. He was a breakthrough into the future. He could hold out during the most terrible time of his people, when the bloody authors of the multivolume collections of smart phrases were now sounding the retreat for the people. The history of the entire world has never known such a man. He grew up under the most merciless, zealous, suspicious and sharp-eyed tyrant. But Stalin felt his primitive vital force and ceded the 1945 parade to him. Let a Caesar or Napoleon try to assume command under a Iosif Dzhugashvili.

At present, they are endeavoring by the use of revelations to force all life to wallow just in the bloody years so that we do not have enough forces and spirit for renewal, for creating the nation and raising children. But when confronted by the younger generation and surrounded by far from friendly neighbors, we should again say that the future is not with OGONEK and not with its opponents. Some want to bring back the founders of the Gulag and the others the supreme head of the Gulag. We have enough wisdom and firmness to pay proper respect to

both without public dishonor, without insulting memory but not taking their confusions and crimes into the future.

We all are in favor of a renewed, strong and flourishing state under the law. We favor perestroika from which will come large, healthy and calm families. We are in favor of glasnost and sobriety so that not a single person line up for his vodka. For a start, following the example of the Scandinavians, we could issue alcohol for holidays by special coupons without counting women and young persons under the age of 22, until they have completed a VUZ or have served their time in the army or navy. We are in favor of equal rights for all nations. We favor cost accounting of the republics so that Russia at least after 70 years could spend its resources on its own sons. We are in favor of true charity and wise patience so that fear and lies can be driven out once and for all from the life of our state.

The Russians are the only people in history who have never left the boundaries of the state created by them. If there were space I would show this in figures. All indigenous Russians left the motherland after persecution including the Dukhobors, the Old Believers and the White emigres. An incurable longing for the motherland thus is a Russian disease. All the Russians residing in the republics of the Transcaucasus and Central Asia were predominantly the victims of the hunger in the 1920s and the terrible year of 1933. Do you remember "Tashkent—The Grain City"?

The Russians are the only people in history which established a state where the homeland lives worse than its previous dependent borderlands and this was when the children of Russia were dying in millions from starvation. The Russians are the only people in the world who put innumerable victims on the altar of fraternity without ever reminding anyone of this. The ascetics taught their people this over a thousand years.

The ancients said that no good deed remained unpunished. An army should never participate within its country in pacifying its fellow citizens, except in exceptional instances when the head of state gives the order. At present, the officers are becoming the first victims of escapades by blinded chauvinists.

The Russian people, I repeat, never counted their good deeds. But evidently in order for socialism to be an actual accounting, for the completeness of truth, the time of reckoning has arrived. All extreme nationalists feel that their republics are being fleeced for the benefit of the center. The most sobering and healthy thing we have is cost accounting. But in order that there not be false rumors, insults and mutual suspicion, before introducing it we should set up 15 state commissions in each Union republic and estimate just how much over the 70 years they have received in railroad ties, nails, sheet iron, machine tools, capital, petroleum, grain and VUZes. And also how much they have given back to the Union Fund. The need has arisen to know who owes whom.

Such a step would be sensible, wise and timely. Here the balance of debts should be drawn only using world prices, for ours is a world state and it should find where to sell its Siberian oil. We might even disregard the fact that Russia freed the Georgians and Armenians from physical extermination and in German Riga the Latvians were prohibited from living until the arrival of the Russians. How can we not recall that before the arrival of the Russian regiments on each Baltic estate, there were gallows and that Russian serf law was the gentlest in Europe. Even in the worst nightmare can you imagine a Russian estate with a gallows in its midst?

We have asked what Pushkin would have done today. He would have set to recreating Russia and writing about Zhukov. He would have been amazed by the fact that 50 million men took to arms in World War II and the greatest general among all the belligerents was produced by that people which had lost most of their sons. Not a single fighting people had since World War I behind them civil carnage, the camps, starvation, forced migrations, executions and purges. All the same, precisely the land of Aleksandr Nevskiy produced Zhukov. And what a deed this man achieved, what power of mind and unbending nature surrounded by the fear-paralyzed servers of the cult. It was like a miracle! It was a sign. The people who produced such a horseman would overcome both vodka, a consumer spirit and the devil. Zhukov was both a mystery, a hope, and an entire people can be educated in his image. Zhukov brought together all ages, traditions and regimes. He was a winner of the St. George Cross, a dragoon and four times Hero of the Soviet Union. Fortunate the officer corps having such representatives. But it was not always happy.

Here one must point out the main fact. By February 1917, some 80 percent of the Russian officers were sons of the laboring people. It was they who from warrant officers schools took the place of the regular officers downed in fighting. Consider this fact of the greatest historical significance. This was the first time such a social shift had occurred since the "Tale of Ancient Times." When our writers, scholars, historians and commentators reflect or groan over the truly terrible defeats of the Soviet Army in 1941, then they, as if upon command, trigger a stereotype mechanism in the mind. They all say two things: that Stalin did not heed the warning about the attack and that he had repressed innocent command personnel prior to the war. These two ideas are stinging but they historically remain unsettled and will always becloud the picture of the real reasons but this confusion has become dogma even for the academic scribblers.

The history of our army and its officer corps does not begin in 1918. By the start of 1925, a Central Committee commission conducted an all-encompassing, careful and dispassionate check on the entire Red Army and with the harsh rectitude of those years reported that the army "as an organized, trained and politically indoctrinated force with mobilization supplies at present does not exist in our country and it is not battleworthy." After this began

the famous military reform of 1924-1925. This is the state to which the armed forces had been brought by the "permanent destroyers" headed by the "military leaders" Trotsky and Stalin (Bronshiteyn and Dzhugashvili). In what pits were buried the officer corps which came to serve with the Reds? Whatever happened to the sons of the people who became officers in the trenches of World War I? Let these searches be the concern of those who willingly relish the repressions. But now this is not the issue.

Living on my street is Yuriy Borisovich Shmarov, a former officer from the Narva Hussar Regiment. There are just a few remaining from the high nobles who were in the old army prior to the revolution. He is a famous expert on the genealogy of the Russian noble families and a historian of the Russian country estates. Under Stalin, Shmarov sat 25 years in prison. Now he is over 90. Several years ago, I met him at the corner of Starokonyushennyy Lane and Ryleyev Street on the Arbat and asked:

"Yuriy Borisovich, in what year were you arrested?"

He straightened up, ran his hand through his thick grey hair and lifting his chin as they did in junker times, said slowly and distinctly:

"The year 1933," and then pausing a moment spat out: "The last officer recruitment!"

So, the last officer recruitment was not in 1938....

The defeat of 1941 was set even in 1924. Then when we did not have an army, our future rival had kept its officer corps then the best in the world in tact. When the Germans said that they were "unvanquished on the battlefield," they were not boasting. The Entente had been unable once to deal the Germans a tangible defeat in the 4 years of bloodshed. Moreover, the German Army did not allow the enemy into its land and everywhere ended the war on enemy territory. The Germans possessed a General Staff of the highest skill and patriotism and schooled over the decades in the works of such minds as Clausewitz, Moltke, Schlieffen and not by executions. Now you can realize why even Romania was glowering and the eastern neighbors were dreaming of "tramping on Russian land"? Do you think that if there had been no army in 1925 that it would suddenly appear in 1940, some 15 years later? This is only the opinion of those who have replaced reality, life and facts for TV junk and feels that if he is in favor of peace, then all the neighbors are pacifists while others have come to believe that the entire world has long been making friends, driving fate and only he, the dense savage, has not been able to disarm. From 1925 through 1941, we were still marking time and did not have an officer class, as the Finnish events were to show.

Let me repeat again. If any nation (not only ours) in 1925 did not have an army, then under no circumstances could there have been one in 1941. An officer corps is established not in 15 years or not in a generation but

rather over the centuries of wars, traditions, training and sacrifices. We could gain a new officer corps either through a century of hard work or by terrible bloodshed. History doomed us to the latter. Then in December 1941, in one of the orders Stalin admitted that we still did not have a real officer corps but in February 1943 he announced that we now did. And he was right. This was a new officer corps born in a year and a half of encirclements, defeats, death and blood and this was the Stalin-grad officer corps. We needed some symbolic state act which would confirm the birth of the great phenomenon and this was found. On the shoulders of the new officer corps in 1943, there again glistened the gold of the shoulderboards and this was the highest quality gold born out of sacrificial service. This officer corps was headed by Zhukov, the truly first marshal. This is why if the date of the German attack had been known to Stalin a year before the war and the victims of the repressions in 1937-1938 were all still alive, in this instance nothing would have changed fundamentally and the start of the war would have still been in favor of Germany. It is impossible to build up an army in a nation where in collectivization and starvation the account of those dead runs into the scores of millions of the most vital portion of the people. It is impossible to create in a time of pestilence all the more when persons who in an army of future rivals would scarcely reach lieutenant are promoted hurriedly as marshals. This is why what was done in the weaponry area after 1937 seems still improbable. It was precisely then that the T-34 and KV tanks were born as well as virtually all types of aircraft. I am convinced that Uborevich and Tukhachevskiy would have not been any better than Voroshilov and Kulik in handling the German tank wedges. By 1941, we already surpassed the Germans in terms of the number of new type tanks such as the T-34, but we still were unable to employ them. And this ability is evolved over the centuries or is born as a miracle in the person of a single genius who was Zhukov.

In the nature of the Russian, there is a very precious property. This is diffidence which has been deepened by Byzantinism to such a degree that a person immediately begins to believe any rubbish stated about him and his motherland, particularly in the press or on television and this at times becomes pornography. And he not only believes but is tortured by this, he infects others and gives it up for lost.

The motherland begins not with the rod but rather with the family and the home and there lies salvation. Let the children grow up in this home, without ever hearing the knock on the door at night and see the smiles of their father and mother in the morning. In order that the home be free of reciprocal suspicion, caution and cruelty, we should follow those who pointed out the way in life to us, we should follow Zhukov who removed the Stalinists, Beriia and Molotov and destroyed Naziism in Berlin, and like him pronounce anathema and forget

both Trotsky, Stalin, Leyba Bronshteyn and Iosif Dzhughashvili. Outlaw murderers! There is no other way. But there is both perestroika, a state under the law and creation.

We said that by 1925, we did not have an army. In quantitative terms, year after year and because of a lack of fund, it had been cut back from 5.5 million to 500,000. But even this small contingent was used as a labor army at construction sites, in harvesting, cutting fuel and on other infinite work projects of the chaos. The soldiers frequently marched in their summer uniforms, in felt boots and not half-starving but desperately hungry. The military reform of 1924-1925 became a reality. In September a law was adopted on obligatory military service for all citizens. Then Trotsky was replaced in the post of chairman of the Republic RVSR by a man who had commanded the defeat of Kolchak and Wrangel and was now carrying out the military reform. He was Mikhail Frunze.

In the autumn of the same year, Georgiy Zhukov for the first time demonstrated his world-caliber qualities.

Three young officers, three riders, having completed the Cavalry Courses and accompanied by friends, left Leningrad on a 1,000-km race to their place of service in Minsk. One of them was Zhukov. At that time, using today's language, they set a world record. In those harsh lean times in this challenge to fate by the peasant children, the three "bumpkins," there was something of a tale of youth and daring. Later on, Zhukov was to sign Germany's surrender. In 1953, three officers decisively entered a Politburo session and the three battle-hardened soldiers, the three military leaders, carried out an action which was to influence the fate of the world. Walking in front firmly and silently was Zhukov and behind him were Gens Moskalenko and Batitskiy.

Their every step seemed like a century.

In the eerie silence, Zhukov's commanding voice rang out and the then unambiguous words were pronounced:

"Beriya has been arrested!"

This was a new tale of "St. George and the Dragon."

And as in the fable, the deflated blood-thirsty dragon humbly followed the people's champion.

No matter what Zhukov did in his life, there always was some feeling of musical triumph. Like a poet of action, Zhukov is indisputably the greatest artist of the world and the most brilliant figure in Russian history. For the entire war, he was in the saddle, "the steed brought wings to the Cossack," and he never parted with his accordion. After the war he was able before his disgrace to establish the institution of military directors.

All today's officer corps can boldly be called Zhukov. His deeds, spirit and will should become the standard for the new officer assemblies. Zhukov held out in circumstances where any Bonaparte or Caesar would have given

up. There is one feature which best of all shows Zhukov's greatness and that is he began when we still did not have an officer corps. On 23 June 1941, on the second day of the war, Stalin summoned Meretskov to Moscow in order to make him an advisor at Headquarters. In Moscow, Meretskov, instead of being sent to the Kremlin, was carried off to Lubyanka and high officials from the NKVD [People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs] beat him with rubber rods. Even Beriya after his arrest admitted that this had been a "meat grinder." If the former chief of the General Staff of a power at war is beaten until he is half-dead in the capital and is later thrown out, then this means that there is still no officer corps. You might think that Zhukov did not know what could await him and perhaps it might be even worse. But he did know. But he never flinched and thereby he charmed even Koba.

The Metropolitan Filaret of Belorussia wrote how on the western frontier of the republic a priest in a letter had complained to Zhukov that the Germans, in retreating, had destroyed the church and carried off the church bells. At that time, Zhukov was conducting an offensive against Berlin. Soon thereafter, a railroad car full of bells arrived at the Belorussian village by rail with a platoon of soldiers for putting them up. The secret of his genius and indomitability was in a profound belief in his destiny as a representative of all the people from the infant to the elderly, as their champion, as if he felt every instant their eye on him. Hence the insomnia, the harshness and the inexorable hate for falseness.

In this officer each person noticed the traits that were particularly close to him as befit a hero of the people. Among the clergy there was the firm conviction that Zhukov carried along with him in his car an image of the Kazan Virgin, the most "militant" and military icon. This is explained by many factors and also by the fact that this icon participated in all the important battles and inspired the soldiers in driving the interventionists out of Russia in 1612. And by the fact that Zhukov had developed as an individual and as a soldier in the Tsarist Army, where he had been awarded the St. George's Crosses. And when I asked an acquaintance archimandrite if one could believe this fact, he commented mildly that such deeds are not a matter of record and this is a question not of knowledge but of faith.

Scarcely anyone did more in history than Zhukov to rescue his country and no one in our history has been so hushed up. Even now, they fear the charm and power of this individual and he triumphed when everyone was fettered by fear. He was victorious over all and pointed to the way. Zhukov at the Victory Parade triumphed over Stalin as now recognized by all the people. The Supreme, and we must give him his due, did not review the parade because he was too old for the saddle. A different solution could have been found using a motor vehicle. No, Stalin realized best of all what force was greater than him and Hitler, without even mentioning such a cipher as Trotsky and company—and he made a toast to this force. Stalin realized, in using the language

of the tale about the Battle of Kulikovo, that "the time of the Tatars was over and the time of the Russians had begun."

Straightforwardness is the secret of Zhukov's invincibility and the nationwide affection for him. In childhood, each of us comes into contact with the sayings from which the fables at one time were created. Napoleon called the 1812 Patriotic War the "Russian War." Later, the Nazis called the Great Patriotic War the "Russian Campaign." These names are encountered in foreign publications about the two wars which became turning points in the history of not only our nation but also all mankind. They, these names, belittle the importance of the sacrifices and the battles and are in the same false rank as "General Frost." What sort of wars were these then which the world's best armies of the centuries were defeated and each once and for all?

The word "straight" in Russian since antiquity has meant "honest," "clear," "just" and "popular." For this reason, the outstanding poet Nikolay Yazykov in a verse which was the only one, in the evidence of Gogol, which caused Pushkin to cry, Pushkin who said about himself: "Hard Slav, I have not shed tears but understand them,"—in this poem about the fate of Moscow and Russia in 1812 called the Patriotic War, the "Right-Russian War."

The war against Naziism to an even greater degree was a Right-Russian War for "the unbreakable alliance of free republics" was headed by the Russian people by the right of sacred sacrifice: among all those who fell "for their friends" in this war, two-thirds were the children of Russia.

The same Batyushkov who is not to be found in the child's "Mother Tongue" but instead of him the pesticides from the time of stagnation said as if disclosing the secret of Zhukov's deeds: "Nothing gives so much strength to the mind, heart and soul as constant honesty" and added: "Honesty is a straight line." Certainly Zhukov was braver, smarter and kinder than his rivals because he was more honest than all of them.

At the Victory Parade invisibly present were all those who fell in battles and all generations of those who died for Russia. Zhukov was not alone and in front of him were the composite regiments of his brothers in arms. On the rostrums were the young people's commissars of victory such as Dimitriy Usitnov, Vyacheslav Malyshev, Boris Vashnikov and Petr Parshin. Nearby was a group of talented inventors (on the battlefield the Russian mind was the equal of German genius), the creators of weapons such as the Dukhovs, Degtyarevs, Shpitalnyys, Fedorovs, Grabins, Tokarevs, Tupolevs, Lavochins, Kotins and of them not just Ilyushin was the 13th child in a peasant family but virtually all of them were "bumpkins," the same peasant children as two-thirds of the officers in the Russian Army of 1917. The current deputy minister of defense, Ivan Tretyak, Hero of the Soviet Union and Hero of Socialist Labor, the only

professional military man who during the war had a price set on his head by the Germans writes that in the Siberian Division where he, incidentally, as a 20-year-old commanded a regiment, the Siberian guardsmen called each other peasants. Often one could hear: "Today will be hard for our peasants." But the most inspiring and favorite expression of the Siberians was "peasants can do everything!"

The world was informed of this by the "bumpkin" Georgiy Zhukov in reviewing the parade of peasants who truly "could do everything!"

After the parade, the victors assembled in the heart of the Kremlin, in the St. George's Hall which preserves the memory of the Russian military. At the formal dinner honoring the victors, Stalin would make a toast which would end the entire age of repressions and permanent purges and admit that the war had brought about a historic "changing of the guard." Assembled in the Kremlin were the great grandchildren of those who had built it and defended it for 700 years. I do not know toasts full of great historical meaning, for Stalin began his career certainly without having this toast in mind. Not more than 7 years before this, the capital's radio still did not broadcast "This is Moscow" but rather stated in an alienated and cold manner: "This is the Comintern!"

Here is this famous toast the concluding words of which the simple people of all Russia passed on to one another as a blessing, in exaltation and without believing they could be true. I remember this from my childhood.

"...I would like to make a toast to the health of our Soviet people and above the Russian people.

"I drink first of all to the health of the Russian people, because they are the most outstanding nation of all the nations comprising the Soviet Union.

"I make a toast to the health of the Russian people because during this war they earned recognition as the leading force of the Soviet Union among all the peoples of our nation.

"I make a toast to the health of the Russian people not only because they are the leading people but also because they have a clear mind, steadfast character and patience.

"Our government has made many mistakes and there were moments for us of a desperate situation in 1941-1942, when our Army was retreating, abandoning our home villages and towns in the Ukraine, Belorussia, Moldavia, Leningrad Oblast, the Baltic, the Karelo-Finnish Republic, and abandoned them because there was no other way out. A different people might tell the government: You have not met our expectations, step down, we will provide a different government which would conclude a truce with Germany and give us peace and quiet. But the Russian people did not do this for they believed in the correctness of our government's policy and made the sacrifices to ensure the defeat of Germany. And this trust of the Russian people in the Soviet

government was that decisive force which ensured the historic victory over the enemy of mankind, fascism.

"Thanks to you, the Russian people for this trust!"

"To the health of the Russian people!"

I should say that in the mouth of Koba the words "our government" and "trust of the Russian people" have such a blasphemous that it is hard not to curse. But here we must restrain ourselves. Not out of respect for Stalin but because of gratitude toward the Russian people whom even he was forced to respect. I will not speak here about what he merited. His very speech, regardless of his forced recognition of the people who had saved his skin and which was as precious to him as it was to Trotsky—in each word there is a non-Georgian, covert cunning for he along with his friend-enemy Trotsky the absolute opposite of the notion of direct." Let us not say anything more about Dzhughashvili out of respect for the state which history caused him to lead. They, the Gulag founders, hated him not so much for the repressions as for the fact that he was smarter and cleverer than all of them taken together and most importantly for the fact that he forced them to destroy one another and did so even without finishing university as Bukharin and the other possessors of collected works. Although Trotsky was a butcher, it was with a certain operetta decadence: a convertible Rolls Royce, a leather jacket and riding britches, himself small, vain and wearing a pince nez. He was a small as Koba was. In their clothing they imitated the then reckless and intelligent brave aviators. Koba never imitated anybody. In his youth, he wrote better verses than they did. Chavchavadze himself published Stalin's young verses not anywhere but in the Georgian national holy of holies the "Dedaena" as we would write it. This was particularly weird as Koba was not, as they were, an orator but he vanquished his rivals, however, not merely by merciless conspiracy but by the fact that he absolutely commanded one ordinary human quality and that was that no one in the world ever saw doubt in Koba's yellow eyes. He knew his associates and they were cut from the same cloth as he. All of them to a man were short-statured, and all were tuned to one self-seeking chord of how to butter up to power. They all had pseudonyms. The slightest doubt of sensitivity and the Gulag workers would reeducate the back of your head. Zhukov through the truth and his feat was able to rise about them all. We now live in Zhukov's times. Perestroika owes its existence to him. Russian society over the centuries lived with the ideal of Ilya Muromets although he was long since gone. The Ilya Muromets whose day of death was not celebrated in 1988 by a single newspaper or magazine in the nation. Even Ilya Muromets, according to current concepts was the chief of a border patrol and not the first Russian officer. The army's roots are so deep. Here is who historically has replaced the Gulag workers and who resurrected the Russian officer corps.

(Conclusion follows)

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SECURITY CLASSIFICATION LIFTED

From Positions of Strength and Threats

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[Article by Col Gen B.A. Omelichev, first deputy chief of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces: "Start of Early Days of Cold War Policy Reviewed"]

[Text] Even in the course of World War II and after it, it was repeatedly asserted that the United States had made an error of a strategic sort having linked itself with the Soviet Union by the ties of the anti-Hitler coalition. The former leader of the Republican Party, R. Taft, in the book "Foreign Policy for Americans" recalled that he as early as 25 June 1941 had warned that the victory of the communists in the war "would be much more dangerous for the United States from the ideological viewpoint than the victory of Naziism."

The consequence of such thinking was the Cold War which the United States unleashed. Actually, the Cold War in many statements by American politicians and military figures was related to the victory over Naziism. As early as 1952, McCarthy said: "It can be firmly asserted that World War III began with the Russian victory at Stalingrad."¹

Thus, the Cold War began in that year when the Nazi invaders were dealt a blow after which the defeat of Nazi Germany was obvious.

Arguments about the "unnaturalness" of the alliance of the United States and the USSR in a war against Naziism became widely current in bourgeois political science. They had a precise aim. It was essential to prepare the Americans for a possible new war but now against the Soviet people. Speaking on 5 March 1946 in Fulton, Missouri, Churchill issued the challenge: "At present the United States stands at the peak of world might...you should feel...also concern so as not to lose the achieved positions. At present, there is a favorable opportunity...take care, there may not be enough time. Let us not behave in such a manner to let events develop by themselves."² At that time, England was continuing to keep before the war's end in its occupation zone of Germany some 700,000 organized German troops³ clearly hoping on a "favorable opportunity."

The speech by W. Churchill expressed what in actuality had already become U.S. foreign policy by that time. According to the evidence of W. Taubman, even on 23 April 1945, H. Truman held a talk with V.M. Molotov in a challenging manner and this meant a "new American crusade" which would change the course of history. At the same time, in Taubman's opinion, the American president still lacked confidence. This came with the acquisition of atomic weapons and developed into the Truman Doctrine the first formulated political directive which officially marked the beginning to the Cold War.

In March 1947, at a joint session of Congress, the American president, in justifying American claims to world domination, said that the "free peoples" expect from the United States the defense of "their freedoms," calling for "decisiveness" in carrying out the "leading role."

K. London in the work "How Foreign Policy is Made"⁴ felt that the United States could and should employ the atomic bomb as a means of national policy and as long as the Soviet Union did not have the atomic bomb, he demanded an intensifying of the Cold War in order to prepare people for a "hot war."

G. Almond in the book "The American People and Foreign Policy" urged not to fear the consequences of a war and to begin it immediately in the name of defending democratic "values." Mankind may not "return either affection or respect for such a policy..." asserted Almond, "but the American people will approve it even as they would approve a preventive war against the USSR."⁵

Many American politicians saw the U.S. task in securing in the world as many strategically important points as possible and readying the troops for them to hold these territories. Germany was declared to be a springboard for further advance towards the Balkans and into the Ukraine.

All these statements are particularly noteworthy in the fact that they were formulated against the background of an active elaboration of actual plans for nuclear attack on the Soviet Union. If one compares the texts of the National Security Council [NSC] Directives on this question and the system of evidence by political figures in favor of war, then great coincidences are clearly visible.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff on 19 September and 9 November 1945 approved the "Bases for Formulating American Military Policy" (1496/2) and the "Strategic Concept and Plan for Employing the U.S. Armed Forces" (1518). Directive 1496/2 provided for the possibility of a preemptive attack. "We cannot allow," it stated, "that due to our erroneous and dangerous ideas concerning the inadmissibility of our own aggressive actions the first strike is launched against us. Under these conditions our government should quickly adopt a political decision while preparations be made for launching the first strike in the event of necessity."⁶

In October 1945, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended that atomic research and the production of nuclear weapons be accelerated and in a secret study of 31 November 1945⁷ designated the bombing targets. They listed the first Soviet cities which could expect the same fate as Hiroshima and Nagasaki: Moscow, Leningrad, Gorkiy, Kuybyshev, Sverdlovsk, Novosibirsk, Omsk, Saratov, Kazan, Baku, Tashkent, Chelyabinsk, Nizhniy Tagil, Magnitogorsk, Perm, Tbilisi, Novokuznetsk, Groznyy, Irkutsk and Yaroslavl.⁸ By the autumn of 1947, some 100 urban centers had been set as objectives

of a nuclear strike. In the first strategic air operations plan drawn up in 1948 it was pointed out that "the main particular feature of nuclear weapons is the ability to destroy accumulations of people and this particular feature must be employed."⁹ During those years, general and specific plans were worked out for combat operations and atomic bombings and these were given the names Broiler, Frolic, Harrow and others.

The document of the Joint Chiefs of Staff "Directive on the Questions of Strategic Planning" (1.05.1947) stated: "If military bases are established and there is the possibility of employing the lines of communications, the United States soon after the start of a war can initiate offensive strategic military air operations against the vitally important industrial and urban centers of Russia. It is essential to assign the land, air force and naval forces for capturing key areas in the aim of increasing the effectiveness of the strategic air raids and in the event of necessity for beginning a major land offensive."

The enterprises of the Soviet petroleum industry "could be subjected to very efficient bombing from bases located on the southern coast of the Mediterranean or in the Cairo—Suez area. The areas around Moscow the bombing of which would produce the greatest morale effect are within the reach of the B-29 bombers based on the British Isles or in the Cairo—Suez area. The vitally important centers of the Ural and Kuzbass can be reached from bases located in India. For this reason, in the aim of carrying out a maximally effective strategic air war, it is essential to have bases in the Near East, the British Isles and in India.

"Complete control over the USSR could clearly be ensured by occupying a limited amount of territory, however due to the significant area and the number of people (military and civilians) which would have to be kept under control, it would require rather significant Allied Armed Forces."¹⁰

A year prior to this the presidential assistant C. Clifford submitted a report "American Policy Toward the Soviet Union" which set a course for war. "The vulnerability of the Soviet Union," the report stated, "is not so great due to the enormous sizes of its territory on which the main industrial enterprises and mineral deposits are located. Nevertheless, the Soviet Union can be dealt significant harm with the aid of atomic weapons, biological warfare or air raids. For this reason, the United States should be ready for atomic and biological warfare and maintain its might on a level sufficient for effective intimidation of the Soviet Union."¹¹

During these years a structure was shaped designed to coordinate the preparations for and waging of war against the USSR. At the end of 1947, a Defense Department was established and this was headed by J. Forrestal, well-known for his ultrarightist views. The National Security Council (NSC) was also established and this was headed by the president for coordinating American military efforts. Beginning in 1947, military

strategy was worked out predominantly by this body and later drawn up in the form of plans of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The most characteristic documents of this period were the memorandums NSC-7, 20/1, 20/2, 58.

What according to the American plans should happen in the USSR? On this matter the Directive NSC 20/1 was completely frank. "At present," it stated, "among the Russian emigres there is a number of interesting and strong groupings.... Any of them would be preferable, from our viewpoint, than the Soviet government for ruling Russia."¹² And then: "On each part of the territory liberated from the Soviets we must deal with persons who have worked in the Soviet system of power. With the organized retreat of the Soviet troops, the local apparatus of the Communist Party will probably shift to an illegal status, as it did in the oblasts which were occupied by the Germans in the last war. Clearly it will operate in the form of partisan bands and rebel detachments. In this instance, it is relatively simple to answer the question: "What is to be done?" as we must merely provide the noncommunist (of whatever sort they might be) Russian bodies in control of an oblast with the necessary weapons, support them in military terms and permit them to deal with the communist bands in accord with the traditional method of a Russian civil war.

"A much more difficult problem is created by the rank-and-file members of the Communist Party or by the workers of the Soviet apparatus who are discovered and arrested or who surrender to our troops or any Russian power.... We can be certain that such a power would be able better than we ourselves to judge the danger which the former communists might represent for the security

of the new regime and deal with them so that they would not cause harm in the future...."¹³

After the organization of the North Atlantic Pact in 1949, the further development and equipping of the armed forces of the main capitalist countries were carried out not only within national limits but also within the blocs.

A separate theory was even born, the theory of "interdependence" the essence of which came down to the fact that the United States would give basic attention to nuclear weapons and their delivery systems to the target (strategic, tactical and carrier-launched aviation, various missiles as well as other new military equipment). The remaining participants in the blocs should develop chiefly their ground forces. Thus, while in the United States the number of ground forces did not exceed as an average 37-40 percent of the total size of the armed forces, in France, Italy, West Germany and Turkey, the ground forces were responsible from 75 to 85 percent of the total number of the armed forces.¹⁴

Regardless of the fact that after the end of World War II, the leading capitalist countries were carrying out a process of gradual demobilization, not one of them actually intended to achieve full demobilization of its armed forces and reduce their numbers to the prewar level. On the contrary, after 1948 until the beginning of the 1950s, the number of armed forces began to steadily rise (Table 1).

This is apparent even more clearly from the budget allocations for military needs (Table 2).

Table 1

Nations	Size of Armed Forces*				
	1939	1948	1950	1951	1952
U.S.A.	238,000	1,050,000	1,510,000	2,940,000	3,394,000
Great Britain	420,000	1,300,000	745,000	800,000	940,000
France	450,000	500,000	600,000	713,000	790,000

* The size of the Armed Forces is shown on the basis of data published in references such as the "World Almanac," "Brassey's Annual" and others.

Table 2—Military Expenditures of the NATO Countries Over the Period From 1949 Through 1959*

Country	Monetary Unit	Expenditures:										Planned expenditures for 1959
		1949	1950	1951	1952	1953	1954	1955	1956	1957	1958	
Belgium	mln. BEF	7,653	8,256	13,387	19,965	19,815	19,925	17,067	17,065	13,356	18,312	19,729
Canada	mln. CAD	372	495	1,220	1,875	1,970	1,771	1,819	1,888	1,829	1,740	1,794
Denmark	mln. DKK	360	359	475	676	889	885	920	936	1,012	990	1,029
France	bln. FRK	479	559	881	1,253	1,387	1,171	1,102	1,469	1,560	1,657	1,798
FRG**	mln. DEM	-	-	-	-	6,195	6,287	7,383	7,211	8,962	6,850	11,527
Greece	mln. GRD	1,630	1,971	2,615	2,655	2,767	3,428	3,688	4,939	4,477	4,469	4,890
Italy	bln. ITL	301	353	457	521	480	543	551	584	611	647	637

Table 2—Military Expenditures of the NATO Countries Over the Period From 1949 Through 1959* (Continued)

Country	Monetary Unit	Expenditures:										Planned expenditures for 1959
		1949	1950	1951	1952	1953	1954	1955	1956	1957	1958	
Luxembourg	mln. LUF	112	170	264	436	488	566	614	395	439	429	396
Netherlands	mln. NLG	680	901	1,060	1,253	1,330	1,583	1,699	1,854	1,845	1,656	1,525
Norway	mln. NOK	370	357	572	831	1,067	1,141	953	967	1,049	1,024	1,083
Portugal	mln. PTE	1,419	1,516	1,553	1,691	1,975	2,100	2,224	2,297	2,391	2,485	2,666
Turkey	mln. TRL	556	599	652	725	864	946	1,077	1,159	1,330	1,484	2,200
Great Britain	mln. GBP	779	849	1,149	1,561	1,684	1,570	1,567	1,614	1,568	1,592	1,611
United States	mln. USD	13,580	14,559	33,398	47,852	49,621	42,900	40,518	41,773	44,548	45,503	46,318
European NATO Countries	mln. USD	4,825	5,445	7,628	10,223	12,424	11,746	11,828	13,132	13,819	12,932	14,090
USA & Canada	mln. USD	13,952	15,054	34,618	49,727	51,591	44,671	42,337	43,661	46,377	47,243	48,112
NATO total	mln. USD	18,777	20,499	42,246	59,960	64,015	56,417	54,165	56,793	60,196	60,175	62,202

* REVUE DE DEFENSE NATIONALE, April 1960, pp 746-767.

** Data for the West German military budget were not published from 1949 to 1953.

The United States, Great Britain and France possessed an unusual number of armed forces for peacetime (Table 1). This was justified, in particular, by the fact that the launching of a surprise strike with nuclear weapons against the major economic and political centers of a state can check the mobilization deployment at the very outset of a war and supposedly for this reason the armed forces needed for conducting combat in the initial period of a war should be fully mobilized, armed and trained even in peacetime. In actuality, this was a desire in peacetime to maintain armed forces which would be capable at any time to make a surprise attack on the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries.

However, it must not be forgotten that the United States as well as England and France immediately after the end of World War II began to consistently carry out measures aimed at maintaining the personnel of the former armed forces of Nazi Germany, resurrect German militarism and create a mass revanchist army.¹⁵ German militarism from this time began to be viewed as the main accomplice in carrying out the war plans.

Among the initial measures were the following:

- The establishing of a special organizational center of former generals and officers from Hitler's General Staff headed by Gens Halder and Guderian and which would be called the "Committee for Studying the History of the War," and here they already included Heusinger and Speidel (actually, they were not engaged in writing materials but rather collecting and studying data on the dispersed personnel of the Nazi Army and working out plans for its recreation);
- Encouraging the activities of all sorts of military and paramilitary unions, associations, and societies

including both officers and generals as well as soldiers (it was assumed that these organizations would become the nucleus of subsequent military formations);

- The organizing of so-called "labor formations" which were set up following the military model and were headed by a mixed American-German command;
- Establishing an extensive police service.

After the formation of the Federal Republic of Germany in 1949, the resurrection of German militarism was put on an official basis. In May 1955, the FRG was officially admitted to NATO. From this time on, the rebirth of its armed forces began to be carried out at an accelerated pace, significantly faster during the period after World War I. In accord with the Paris Treaty, West Germany was permitted in the first stage to organize a regular army of 500,000 men with the subsequent employment of it as the basis for extensive mobilization deployment.

In the United States and Great Britain, beginning approximately with 1954, year after year there was a certain reduction in the overall size of the armed forces. In the United States, for example, in 1958, in comparison with 1954, the reduction was almost 800,000 persons, or 21 percent, and in Great Britain, 300,000, or 24.5 percent. Here both in the United States and in England, chiefly the ground forces were reduced and in the ground forces basically the service and auxiliary subunits. Regardless of the reduction, the fire power of the Armed Forces not only did not decline but rose significantly due to the introduction of nuclear weapons and their carriers.

Since a future war was viewed as a nuclear war, chief attention was given to that type of armed forces which possessed the main carriers of nuclear weapons and could employ them most effectively in the interests of a

successful conduct of a war against the USSR and the other socialist countries. In the opinion of U.S. military leaders, the air force as well as varying-range guided missiles were to be the crucial force at that time. However, priority remained with strategic aviation which was considered the dominant type of armed forces and the chief means of deterrence.

All of this was reflected in the so-called "new course" of American strategy the elaboration of which began in 1953 after the Eisenhower Administration came to power. A 3-year plan was drawn up for the development of the armed forces for the period from July 1954 through July 1957. This envisaged a significant strengthening of the air forces. Budget allocations clearly reflected this policy. While in the 1950-1951 fiscal year, 24.4 percent of the military budget was spent on the Air Force, in the 1953-1954 year, the figure was already 32.3 percent.

From 1955 through 1959, funds were distributed in the following manner: around 46 percent for the air force, around 28 percent for the navy and marines and approximately 23 percent for the ground forces. As for the most important part of the allocations earmarked for the purchase of new weapons, during this period the Air Force systematically received around 60 percent of the allocated funds, the Navy around 30 percent and the Army around 10 percent.¹⁶ In an official Air Force manual which was widely distributed among the personnel of the American Armed Forces, the role of the Air Force was defined in the following manner: "The Air Force is the main military means ensuring the seizing of initiative and the achieving of decisive results in all forms of international relations, including complete peace, a cold war, a limited-scale war and total war."¹⁷

The American plans for unleashing a nuclear war against the USSR were halted by the TASS announcement on 25 September 1949 on the testing of a Soviet nuclear atomic device. The most crushing blow to these plans was made in the second half of 1957 after the successful testing of an intercontinental ballistic missile in the USSR and the launching of the Sputnik. These scientific achievements of the USSR, in being a surprise for American strategists, upset all plans of aggression with impunity.

In American strategy the main wager was put on a surprise strike by strategic aviation and based on the assumed advantage of the United States over the USSR in nuclear weapons, delivery systems to the target and geographic position. With the appearance of nuclear weapons in the USSR, a preventive strike against it was deferred for some time due to the fear of retaliation and the ambiguity of the outcome of the course of the war as a whole. But this in no way meant that the idea had been abandoned of achieving world domination through the atomic destruction of the Soviet Union. On 15 August 1950, the Joint Chiefs of Staff established "the destruction of certain facilities which determine the ability of the Soviet Union to employ atomic bombs"¹⁸ as the prime task. In second place was the task of retarding the

Soviet troop offensive and thirdly the launching of attacks against enterprises producing liquid fuel, conventional and nuclear power plants. These three categories were given the code name Bravo, Romeo and Delta.

On 30 December 1950, a new directive was adopted SNC-68. Its compiling was led by P. Nittse. He used the appearance of nuclear weapons in the Soviet Union in order to give the new directive an even more aggressive nature, to arouse new fears and panic and thereby foster a militaristic psychosis.

A comparison of the texts of official directives from the first postwar decade with what certain political leaders in the United States are saying presently illustrates the consistency of the course of dealing with the Soviet Union from a position of strength. The presidents and secretaries have changed as well as the party in power but the directives have remained as before.

Possibly, the Soviet Union had provided some grounds for such a hostile, aggressive policy? No, it had not. At the same time that the USSR Armed Forces after the defeat of Nazi Germany and militaristic Japan were being switched to peacetime status, their size was also sharply reduced (see the Information). On 23 June 1945, the 12th Session of the USSR Supreme Soviet, First Sitting, adopted the Law on the Demobilization of Older Ages of Personnel in the Operational Army. Workers and kolkhoz members, engineers, physicians, teachers and other specialists were returned to the national economy to peacetime labor. It was essential to lift up the nation, to revive the enemy-devastated land, to rebuild the cities and factories, restore production and reestablish life. Yesterday's military who with weapons in hand had routed the hated Nazi invaders, without a pause, without catching their breath, returned to the difficult, creative work which required high heroism and self-sacrifice.

Against the background of the militant directives and plans of the leaders of the United States to unleash a Third World War and plans to destroy the Soviet Union and the socialist countries, the documents published below on combat training, for example, for the Group of Soviet Occupation Forces in Germany (GSOVG) have a completely different nature. Even yesterday they were secret. But now the security classification has been lifted....

Each reader can see for himself that both the Order of the Commander-in-Chief of the GSOVG No. 015 of 19 January 1946, MSU G.K. Zhukov, on training for the higher command personnel and staffs (of the group, armies and corps) as well as the plan for commander exercises in operational-tactical training at the Field Headquarters of the GSOVG for 1948 and the Operations Plan for the Actions of the Group of 5 November 1946¹⁹ as well as the tasks set for the field forces, formations and units were of a strictly defensive nature.

The published order of the commander-in-chief demands that the combat training of the troops be

carried out considering the experience of the last war and that they study first of all the defensive and withdrawal operations and combat while the main emphasis was put on troop exercises for the formations and units of the various combat arms and Armed Services in working through questions of cooperation and command in combined-arms combat. The troops were instructed to study each type of operation and combat under difficult conditions and here they were to study how to act skillfully with an enemy breakthrough and envelopment of the flanks of our defenses, how to fight in an encirclement under the conditions of the defensive and the retreat.

The planned front and army staff military games, the command-staff field trips, the scientific conferences, special exercises and the corps command-staff field trips were aimed primarily at studying the questions of the defensive and were of a defensive nature. These same aims were pursued by commander training in the GSOVG.

Commander training is a component part of operational and combat training. It consists of political training based upon a study of Marxist-Leninist teachings, operational-tactical and special training, military-technical, weapons, intelligence, physical and procedural training. A large portion of the time is assigned to operational-tactical and special training. The published plan for the commander exercises in operational-tactical training at the field headquarters of the GSOVG for 1948 as approved by the Commander-in-Chief of the GSOVG, MSU V.V. Sokolovskiy on 15 January 1948, clearly shows that an absolute majority of the exercises was dedicated to defensive actions.

Having become familiar with the published documents, any unbiased reader can only draw one conclusion: yes, the GSOVG and the USSR Armed Forces (approximately the same plans were worked out in each troop group and military district) did not have aggressive goals, there was not even a hint of aggression, they did not harbor a grudge and combat training and exercises were based on the principles of defensive doctrine.

Footnotes

1. J. McCarthy, "American Retreat From Victory," New York, 1952, p 31.
2. "Keesing's Contemporary Archives," London, 1946, pp 7770-7771.
3. G. Kolko, "The Politics of War," New York, 1969, p 505.
4. K. London, "How Foreign Policy Is Made," New York, 1949.
5. G. Almond, "The American People and Foreign Policy," New York, 1950, pp 107, 114-115.
6. U.S. Department of State, "Foreign Relations of the U.S., 1946," Washington, Vol 1, 1972, p 1160.

7. A.N. Yakovlev, "Ot Trumena do Reygana: Doktriny i realnosti yadernogo veka" [From Truman to Reagan: Doctrines and Realities of the Nuclear Age], Moscow, Molodaya Gvardiya, 1984, p 16.

8. Ibid.

9. M. Sherry, "Preparing for the Next War," New Have—London, 1977, p 213.

10. J.Th. Etzold, L. Gaddis, "Containment: Documents on American Policy and Strategy, 1945-1950," New York, 1978, pp 302-307.

11. Ibid., p 6.

12. Ibid., p 176.

13. Ibid., p 202.

14. VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL, No 8, 1961, p 53.

15. Ibid., p 60.

16. Maxwell D. Taylor, "The Uncertain Trumpet," New York, 1960, p 173.

17. AIR FORCE JOURNAL, January 1956.

18. "International Security," Spring 1983, Vol 7, No 4, p 4.

19. See: VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL, No 2, 1989.

ORDER OF THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF OF THE GROUP OF SOVIET OCCUPATION FORCES IN GERMANY No. 015

19 January 1946

Potsdam

Content: On training of the higher command personnel and staffs (of the group, armies and corps) of the GSOVG for 1946.

In accord with the directive of the people's commissar of defense, I order the following:

1. In the planning, organization and conduct of training for the superior command personnel and staffs (of the group, armies and corps) of the GSOVG, one is to be guided by the current order, by the calendar plan for operational training and the plan for studying combat equipment (Appendix No. 1-2). The organization and conduct of exercises with the army commanders and commanders of the combat arms of the Group will be carried out by me. Exercises with the corps commanders and the commanders of the combat arms of the troops and individual divisions are to be conducted directly by the army commander.

2. Training of the staffs for all questions of troop command is to be entrusted to the commanders to whom

they are subordinate. Each commander should personally train his own staff, ensure its constant combat readiness and organization and their full responsibility for this.

3. In organizing training for the higher command personnel and staffs, one is to consider the experience and the degree of training of each man and in organizing training for the staffs, in addition, consider the training and efficiency of the departments (directorates) and the staff as a whole so that the basic attention and time be given to working through those questions for which they are less prepared.

For conducting commander training for the higher command personnel in all areas of training, one or two complete training days per month are to be assigned and, in addition, three free evenings a week are to be made available for independent study for increasing one's theoretical and practical knowledge and skills.

Three complete training days a month are to be allocated for the drilling of the staffs (in addition to commander training).

4. For 1946 I set as the main tasks for the training of the higher command personnel and the staffs of all the combat arms of the Group the following:

a) For operational training to study: the defensive operation (combat); a retreat operation (combat); an offensive operation (combat).

Each type of operation and combat is to be studied under difficult conditions of a combat situation: the breakthrough and envelopment of the flanks of our defense by the enemy; combat in an encirclement under the conditions of a defensive and a retreat; encirclement and destruction of the surrounded enemy on the offensive; threats of flanking strikes; breaking out of the encirclement in retreat actions and so forth.

In the aims of studying the experience of the Great Patriotic War and ensuring a more thorough elaboration of questions relating to the organization and conduct of an operation (combat) and particularly the questions of command and cooperation, the holding of the staff, the command-staff exercises and the field trips without fail must be preceded by the following:

a) A study of the theory of the question by reports on the principles of the given question, on the employment of the combat arms and combat equipment, for staff service, for the rear services and other sections; the theoretical provisions given in the reports are to be illustrated and reinforced by examples from the experience of the Patriotic War of 1941-1945;

b) Reports and lectures on the most instructive operations conducted by the Red Army during the Patriotic War;

c) The working out of assignments for independent study of the theory of the question by generals and officers;

d) Special exercises in the staffs to work out operational documents;

e) The solving of surprise questions and group practical exercises in the classroom and the field.

The basic tasks for the operational training of the superior command personnel are set as follows:

1. To study the combat experience of the Red Army in the decisive operations of the Patriotic War;

2. To improve generalship art, to reinforce and develop the skills of the generals in preparing for an operation and in directing the troops under difficult conditions of an operation and combat;

3. To train a viable combined-arms commander capable of bringing together all combat arms in an operation and combat and directing them firmly;

4. To know the properties and capabilities of the artillery, tanks, aviation, engineer troops, signal troops and the organization of the rear services;

5. To know the existing regulations and manuals and be able to apply them in practice;

6. To know the organization, military equipment and operational-tactical principles of the American and English Armies as the most forward armies as well as the French Army;

7. To study and know the new organization of our troops and their employment in various types of an operation and combat.

Particular attention is to be paid to studying the questions of the employment of the new organization of rifle corps (two rifle divisions and one mechanized division).

Tasks Related to Operational Training of Combined-Arms Staffs:

—To reinforce the skills in troop command as acquired during the period of the Patriotic War and achieve the balanced training of the staffs as the headquarters bodies of the command;

—To raise the leading role of the combined-arms staffs on the questions of troop command and organizing cooperation between the special combat arms and services in all stages of preparing and conducting an operation and combat;

—To work out the planning of the operation and combat, the methods of preparing for the operation, the organization of cooperation between the combat arms and troop command in the process of the operation;

—Work out the organization and conduct of continuous reconnaissance in the course of the entire operation;

—Master the techniques of staff service and the operational-tactical calculations related to the employment of the combat arms in the different types of an operation and combat;

—Raise the staff level and organization in the work of the staff;

—Study one's operational sectors;

—Improve the rear services for logistic support of the operation.

In studying a defensive operation and combat, to work out the methods and procedures for checking a surprise enemy breakthrough, having paid particular attention to the following:

- a) The ability to guess and evaluate the enemy's plan;
- b) The ability to quickly assemble the necessary forces for opposing the enemy breakthrough;
- c) The methods of employing the reserves and shifting forces from passive areas of the front for opposing the breakthrough with the immediate task of halting the enemy (the art of closing the breach);
- d) The methods of restoring the situation;
- e) Methods of fighting in an area of obstacles;
- f) The ability to fight in an encirclement and break out of it.

In studying a retreat maneuver under difficult conditions, the following are to be worked on:

- a) The methods of organizing an operational retreat and cooperation between the branches of arms;
- b) The methods and procedures for preparing and carrying out a retreat;
- c) The methods of opposing parallel pursuit;
- d) Particular features of the organization of the rear services and logistic support in a retreat operation.

In studying an offensive operation and combat, to work out:

- a) The methods and procedures for preparing for an offensive operation and combat;
- b) Organizing the committing of the tank and mechanized formations to the breach;
- c) The methods of maintaining continuous cooperation between the combat arms in all stages of the offensive operation and combat;
- d) The organization of deep operational pursuit.

All exercises with the staffs of the corps and armies, as a rule, are to last 3-5 days with a distance up to 100 km from the permanent disposition.

In the analyses of the conducted exercises, games and field trips, various provisions are to be reinforced by examples and conclusions from conducted operations and battles of the Great Patriotic War.

a) Tasks for Operational Training of Staffs of the Special Combat Arms

In planning the operational training for the staffs of the special combat arms, one is to be guided by the instructions and tasks set for the combined-arms staffs and, in addition, work out the following:

1. The methods of the proper and effective use of the combat equipment and materiel of one's combat arm and service in defensive, retreat and offensive operations (battles);
2. The ability to quickly concentrate the combat equipment on the axis of the main thrust and shift its actions from one sector to another;
3. Standard methods of operational-tactical calculations on employing the combat equipment in the different types of an operation and combat.

b) For Marxist-Leninist Training

In the 1946 training year, within the Marxist-Leninist training for the superior command personnel, the following subjects are to be studied:

- 1) Dialectical materialism—the ideology of the Bolshevik party;
- 2) Marx and Engels—the founders of the philosophy of the proletariat;
- 3) The elaboration by Lenin of the theoretical bases of a Marxist party in the book "Materialism and Empirio-criticism";
- 4) The work of Comrade Stalin "On Dialectical and Historical Materialism";
- 5) The basic features of the Marxist dialectical method;
- 6) The importance of Marxist philosophical materialism for the practical activities of the party;
- 7) Basic features of historical materialism;
- 8) Marxism-Leninism on classes and the class struggle;
- 9) The teachings of Lenin and Stalin on the party;
- 10) Basic traits of Russian classical philosophy.

In organizing and conducting the Marxist-Leninist training, one is to be guided by the following instructions:

- a) The study of each subject is planned for a month;
- b) Each subject must be preceded by an introductory lecture given by skilled lecturers from the political directorate and the army political departments;

c) Independent work over the entire month should be reinforced by popular lectures and consultation by workers from the political bodies;

d) At the end of each month, comradely colloquiums are to be held without fail on the studied question and here they are to determine the quality of assimilating the material by each of the participants;

e) At the end of the year, the political directorate is to give quizzes on the above-designated questions by the entire superior command personnel.

The chief of the Group's political directorate by 1 February 1946 is to issue to all superior command personnel a list of literature and the required procedural instructions for each of the recommended subjects.

c) On the Study and Use of Combat Equipment of the Main Combat Arms.

The main task is to study the basic specifications and combat properties of the artillery, tanks, aviation, engineer and chemical equipment, communications equipment and be able to employ them intelligently in the various types of an operation and combat.

In the aim of studying the combat properties and the operational-combat capabilities of the equipment of the branches of arms during the period from March through June 1946, one 3-day assembly is to be organized and conducted on the scale of the Group and the armies.

All the exercises at the assemblies are to be conducted, as a rule, by actual familiarization with each type of equipment and by the demonstrating of its fighting power on the ranges.

In accord with the set tasks for each assembly, the commanders of the combat arms and the chiefs of the services of the Group no later than on 5 February 1946

are to work out detailed programs for studying the equipment of the combat arms and by the start of the assemblies prepare reference information on the tactical and technical specifications of the studied equipment.

After each assembly, its participants are to be given time for independent work on reinforcing and deepening the obtained knowledge and then for the studied type of equipment a quiz is to be taken.

All the generals and senior officer personnel are to continue studying Germany (history, geography and economy) under the leadership of the generals and officers who are well prepared and have a knowledge of Germany.

The study of foreign languages is to be continued considering the achieved level in the knowledge of the language both as part of the study groups as well as individually in the hours of independent work during the evening.

All army commanders are required to provide unswerving supervision and leadership over the course of the training for the superior command personnel and subordinate staffs.

Appendices: 1) A calendar plan for the operational training of the staffs of the corps, armies and the GSOVG for 1946 on "2" sheets.

2) A plan for studying combat equipment on "4" sheets.

Commander-in-Chief of the GSOVG, MSU G. Zhukov
Chief of Staff of the GSOVG, Col Gen Malinin

Military Council Member of the GSOVG, Lt Gen Telegin

Two copies

Correct: Chief of the Department for Operational Training of the Operational Directorate of the Staff of the Group, Col Velyaminov

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**Appendix to Operational Directive No. 1;
APPROVED: Commander-in-Chief of GSOVG, MSU Sokolovskiy, 15 January 1948; SECRET Copy No. 2**

Plan for Commander Exercises on Operational-Tactical Training in Field Headquarters of GSOVG for 1948

Days	Hours	Content of Exercises	Place of Exercises	Who is Present	Leader
1	2	3	4	5	6
14 Jan 48	4	Operational-Tactical Training Subject No. 10. "Organization and Conducts of Defensive Combat of New Organization Rifle Corps." Group exercises on maps.	For directorates and departments	Officers of directorates by lists of chiefs of directorates and depts.	Commanders and chiefs of combat arms and chiefs of directorates
	2	Operational-Tactical Training Subject No. 6. "March of New Organization Rifle Corps and Its Support." Lecture.	Staff mtg. hall	All officers of directorates and departments undergoing program of operational training	Col Sidorov

**Appendix to Operational Directive No. 1;
APPROVED: Commander-in-Chief of GSOVG, MSU Sokolovskiy, 15 January 1948; SECRET Copy No. 2 (Continued)**

Plan for Commander Exercises on Operational-Tactical Training in Field Headquarters of GSOVG for 1948

Days	Hours	Content of Exercises	Place of Exercises	Who is Present	Leader
1	2	3	4	5	6
21 Jan 48	4	Operational-Tactical Training Subject No. 6. "March of New Organization Rifle Corps and Its Support." Group exercises on maps.	For directorates and departments	Officers of directorates and departments by lists of chiefs of directorates and depts.	Commanders and chiefs of combat arms and chiefs of directorates
13 Feb 48	4	Studying Experience of Great Patriotic War Battle of Kursk, defeat of Orel and Belgorod-Kharkov German groupings (Jul-Aug 43). Seminar.	By directorates	Officers of directorates and departments taking program of operational-tactical training	
	2	Operational-Tactical Training Subject No. 3. "Organization of Anti-Tank Defense in Defensive Operation."	"	"	Lt Gen Safronin
3 Mar 48	2	Operational-Tactical Training Subject No. 9. "Organization and Conduct of Artillery and Air Counterpreparations." Lecture.	Staff mtg. hall (Babelsberg)	"	"
28 Apr 48	4	Operational-Tactical Training Subject No. 1. "Essence and Organization of Counteroffensive. Goal and Tasks. Conditions Under Which Counteroffensive Can Commence. Particular Features of Organization and Planning. Employment of Combat Arms. Assembly of Forces and Regrouping of Troops, Choice of Axis of Main Thrust, Forming-up Place and Moment of Going Over to Counter-Offensive. Particular Feature of Organizing Command on a Counter-Offensive." Lecture.	"	Officers taking program of operational-tactical training	Maj Gen Kramar
5 May 48	4	Operational-Tactical Training Subject No. 11. "Organization of Support and Conduct of Front Counterstrike." Group exercise with maps.	By directorates	"	Commanders and chiefs of combat arms and chiefs of directorates
	2	Operational-Tactical Training Subject No. 13. "Organization of Air Defense for Army and Front Rear Services in Defensive Operation." Lecture.	Staff mtg. hall (Babelsberg)	"	Maj Gen Seredin

Appendix to Operational Directive No. 1;
APPROVED: Commander-in-Chief of GSOVG, MSU Sokolovskiy, 15 January 1948; SECRET Copy No. 2 (Continued)

Plan for Commander Exercises on Operational-Tactical Training in Field Headquarters of GSOVG for 1948

Days	Hours	Content of Exercises	Place of Exercises	Who is Present	Leader
1	2	3	4	5	6
7 Jul 45	4	Operational-Tactical Training Subject No. 2. "Organization and Support of Airborne Operation." Lecture	"	"	Maj Gen Kramar
Reserve	8	For studying aviation equipment.			

Chief of Staff of GSOVG, Col Gen Malinin

Chief of Operations Directorate of Staff of GSOVG, Maj Gen Kramar

CORRECT: Chief of Department for Operational Training of Operational Directorate of Group Staff, Col (Sidorov)

Information on Number of Solider and NCO Servicemen Discharged Under Demobilization and Accepted for Military Registration as of 1 June 1947

Name of Oblasts (Krays and Republics and Cities)	Total Registered	Of Those Registered			
		Cities		Rural Localities	
		Men	Women	Men	Women
1	2	3	4	5	6
City of Moscow	241,613	218,714	22,899	-	-
Moscow Oblast	285,663	118,515	7,951	145,058	14,139
Kalinin Oblast	94,239	26,176	2,803	60,967	4,293
Yaroslavl Oblast	81,995	33,096	3,917	40,710	4,272
Vladimir Oblast	66,278	21,692	2,322	38,656	3,608
Ryazan Oblast	113,409	10,331	1,355	94,814	6,909
Tula Oblast	71,500	22,127	2,446	43,156	3,771
City of Gorkiy	32,885	29,974	2,911	-	-
Gorkiy Oblast	130,947	23,459	2,306	97,406	7,776
Ivanovo Oblast	72,663	33,391	4,056	32,247	2,969
Kostroma Oblast	53,095	13,098	1,523	34,976	3,498
Mordovian ASSR	51,871	5,011	331	44,423	2,106
Smolensk Oblast	70,842	13,035	660	54,835	2,312
Velikiye Luki Oblast	40,210	5,960	479	32,122	1,649
Kaluga Oblast	48,181	11,396	1,483	34,237	1,065
Bryansk Oblast	75,287	14,646	590	58,817	1,234
Voronezh Oblast	181,254	29,359	2,499	141,693	7,703
Orel Oblast	77,623	10,332	567	64,381	2,343
Tambov Oblast	96,769	15,309	1,402	73,968	6,090
Kursk Oblast	156,719	14,298	1,084	137,634	3,703
City of Leningrad	173,979	144,276	29,487	190	26
Leningrad Oblast	50,585	13,420	2,150	31,675	3,340
Novgorod Oblast	40,171	6,635	876	29,847	2,813
Pskov Oblast	34,877	6,269	319	27,681	608
City of Novosibirsk	27,133	25,385	1,748	--	
Novosibirsk Oblast	63,106	13,055	634	48,143	1,274

**Information on Number of Solider and NCO Servicemen Discharged Under Demobilization
and Accepted for Military Registration as of 1 June 1947 (Continued)**

Name of Oblasts (Krays and Republics and Cities)	Total Registered	Of Those Registered			
		Cities		Rural Localities	
		Men	Women	Men	Women
1	2	3	4	5	6
Omsk Oblast	66,813	19,143	1,596	44,507	1,567
Kemerovo Oblast	74,047	36,480	2,025	34,517	1,025
Tomsk Oblast	23,974	8,030	599	14,981	364
Tyumen Oblast	45,616	10,350	498	33,422	1,346
Altay Kray	111,117	24,638	1,311	84,325	1,843
Krasnoyarsk Kray	91,623	28,556	2,108	57,150	3,809
Irkutsk Oblast	70,061	29,956	1,541	36,826	1,738
Yakut ASSR	12,539	4,770	33	7,712	24
Tuva Autonomous Oblast	1,396	652	27	708	9
Kuybyshev oblast	88,193	30,661	2,607	50,649	4,276
Saratov Oblast	105,018	33,723	3,370	63,426	4,499
Penza Oblast	87,496	13,553	1,042	67,378	5,523
Ulyanovsk Oblast	56,328	7,415	532	45,056	3,325
Tatar ASSR	105,533	19,318	1,537	79,379	5,299
Mari ASSR	28,255	4,687	407	21,266	1,895
Chuvash ASSR	47,833	6,941	731	37,956	2,205
Udmurt ASSR	42,173	10,864	607	29,458	1,244
Kirov Oblast	101,911	20,304	1,432	74,492	5,683
Arkhangelsk Oblast	42,341	10,882	1,422	28,090	1,947
Vologda Oblast	71,004	13,218	1,692	51,817	4,277
Murmansk Oblast	15,240	11,987	769	2,365	119
Komi ASSR	11,488	2,568	244	8,089	587
City of Sverdlovsk	21,854	20,299	1,555	-	-
Sverdlovsk Oblast	89,665	50,461	2,742	34,766	1,696
Molotov Oblast	76,275	28,337	2,387	43,102	2,449
Chelyabinsk Oblast	76,100	40,691	2,491	31,385	1,533
Kurgan Oblast	48,415	8,161	645	38,041	1,568
Chkalov Oblast	85,533	22,890	1,848	57,798	2,997
Aktyubinsk Oblast	10,972	3,195	137	7,456	184
Guryev Oblast	6,525	2,169	71	4,216	69
West Kazakhstan Oblast	14,621	3,950	225	10,339	107
Bashkir ASSR	121,315	23,530	1,789	93,484	2,512
Rostov Oblast	162,655	58,022	4,602	95,864	4,167
Stalingrad Oblast	86,325	26,897	2,377	54,026	3,025
Astrakhan Oblast	31,766	12,442	1,375	17,217	732
Krasnodar Kray	214,656	47,378	4,438	155,245	7,595
Stavropol Kray	94,056	24,030	1,607	66,264	2,155
Groznyy Oblast	24,805	12,865	1,140	10,390	410
Kabardin ASSR	13,867	6,081	306	7,329	151
North Ossetian ASSR	19,156	9,506	622	8,659	369

**Information on Number of Solider and NCO Servicemen Discharged Under Demobilization
and Accepted for Military Registration as of 1 June 1947 (Continued)**

Name of Oblasts (Krays and Republics and Cities)	Total Registered	Of Those Registered			
		Cities		Rural Localities	
		Men	Women	Men	Women
1	2	3	4	5	6
Chita Oblast	58,865	25,594	1,444	30,139	1,688
Buryat-Mongol ASSR	32,053	11,041	498	20,265	249
Amur Oblast	36,544	14,264	1,188	20,279	813
Khabarovsk Kray	26,744	17,109	1,412	7,795	428
Jewish Autonomous Oblast	8,368	4,933	338	2,795	302
Kamchatka Oblast	6,462	1,918	98	4,230	216
Lower Amur Oblast	12,290	6,381	407	5,378	124
Sakhalin Oblast	16,851	10,851	885	4,893	222
Maritime Kray	74,374	39,748	3,015	28,648	2,963
Crimea Oblast	43,297	18,800	1,195	22,774	528
Dagestan ASSR	22,139	9,080	536	12,446	77
Kaliningrad Oblast	7,947	4,449	702	2,610	186
City of Kiev	39,875	37,026	2,849	-	-
Kiev Oblast	158,595	14,989	892	139,632	3,082
Chernigov Oblast	93,650	10,357	499	80,291	2,503
Kirovograd Oblast	82,708	12,444	430	68,582	1,252
Poltava Oblast	127,253	15,892	1,059	107,032	3,270
Sumi Oblast	94,381	24,873	689	65,966	2,853
Kharkov Oblast	140,854	49,812	3,742	83,173	4,127
Stalinsk Oblast	138,504	86,210	2,762	47,901	1,631
Voroshilovgrad Oblast	98,574	43,341	2,853	48,082	4,298
Dnepropetrovsk Oblast	121,511	47,110	2,333	70,392	1,676
Zaporozhye Oblast	75,968	24,307	1,201	49,187	1,273
Kherson Oblast	41,222	8,628	362	31,642	590
Vinnitsa Oblast	147,821	16,696	627	129,029	1,469
Kamenets-Podolskiy Oblast	104,155	7,816	604	94,640	1,095
Chernovtsy Oblast	35,470	7,764	732	26,766	208
Stanislav Oblast	35,244	5,365	552	29,198	129
Ternopol Oblast	52,128	3,526	182	48,262	158
Cisrpathian Oblast	6,663	1,859	143	4,576	85
Lvov Oblast	43,395	14,673	2,180	26,083	459
Rovno Oblast	36,680	4,912	299	31,327	142
Zhitomir Oblast	92,030	11,406	735	77,873	2,016
Volyn Oblast	45,939	4,181	234	41,443	81
Drogobych Oblast	32,186	5,283	565	26,249	89
Odessa Oblast	104,681	34,901	1,817	67,067	896
Nikolayev Oblast	42,321	10,509	401	30,964	447
Izmail Oblast	26,724	5,000	230	21,338	156
Minsk Oblast	47,950	17,743	896	28,799	512
Molodechno Oblast	27,669	1,296	59	26,250	64

**Information on Number of Solider and NCO Servicemen Discharged Under Demobilization
and Accepted for Military Registration as of 1 June 1947 (Continued)**

Name of Oblasts (Krays and Republics and Cities)	Total Registered	Of Those Registered			
		Cities		Rural Localities	
		Men	Women	Men	Women
1	2	3	4	5	6
Polotsk Oblast	28,158	2,238	169	25,353	398
Vitebsk Oblast	37,299	8,894	479	26,874	1,052
Mogilev Oblast	44,380	7,336	389	35,829	826
Baranovich Oblast	32,640	3,070	387	38,998	185
Grodno Oblast	22,690	3,995	465	18,156	74
Brest Oblast	28,292	1,776	209	25,998	309
Pinsk Oblast	25,725	2,422	98	23,149	56
Polesye Oblast	23,308	2,747	149	20,084	328
Gomel Oblast	36,367	9,301	504	25,928	634
Bobruysk Oblast	37,573	5,227	422	31,560	364
Moldavia	132,759	13,582	583	118,349	245
Uzbekistan	149,941	60,942	1,911	86,604	484
Kirghizia	56,805	18,095	438	38,113	159
Tajikistan	32,260	12,342	236	19,621	61
Turkmenia	34,849	16,274	471	18,014	90
Kazakhstan (minus West Kazakhstan, Guryev and Aktyubinsk Oblasts)	204,105	70,848	2,035	129,842	1,380
Georgia	110,501	36,493	2,255	70,739	1,014
Armenia	39,522	12,300	582	26,122	518
Azerbaijan	93,543	43,515	6,327	41,825	1,876
Estonia	29,451	13,115	851	15,145	340
Karelo-Finnish SSR	15,631	6,718	773	7,656	484
Latvia	51,196	24,509	2,836	23,635	216
Lithuania	59,968	13,458	1,078	45,173	259
Total for Union:	8,698,502	2,709,843	220,577	5,542,549	225,533

Chief of Mobilization Directorate, Lt Gen Nikitin

Chief of 3d Department, Col Shcherbakov

18 June 1947

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**VIEWPOINTS, JUDGMENTS,
VERSIONS**

Early Days of Soviet Defense Ministry Described

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[Article by Col (Ret) N.A. Molodtsygin, candidate of
historical sciences, docent: "120 Days of the Narko-
moyen; From the History of the Transition to Orga-
nizing a Mass Regular Red Army"]

[Text] Perestroyka in historical science involves the most
important questions related to the development of the
Soviet Armed Forces. It is essential to investigate the
"blank spots" of history, to correctly assess the problems
of preparing and waging not only the Great Patriotic
War but also the Civil War and restore the forgotten
names of the honest military leaders who made a strong
contribution to establishing and improving the new
military organization of the proletarian state. This
applies also to L.D. Trotsky who for a long time headed
the People's Commissariat for Military Affairs [Narko-
moyen] (March 1918—beginning of 1925) and until the
autumn of 1918, the Higher Military Council and later
the Republic Revolutionary Military Council [RVSR].

It is impossible to agree with the judgment of D.A.
Volkogonov that "Trotsky during the years of his active
work in the party (1917-1924) was not an enemy of the
revolution and socialism" (PRAVDA, 9 September

1988). Yu.I. Korablev has gone even farther: "It is correct that Trotsky during the days of the October Revolt and during the years of the Civil War did a good deal for the victory of the revolution, for the organizational development of the Red Army and for organizing its victories and that his activities were highly regarded by Lenin, the party Central Committee and the VTsIK [All-Russian Central Executive Committee] (POLITICHESKOYE OBRAZOVANIYE, No 2, 1989, p 57). I have always followed Yu.I. Korablev, my teacher.

The given documentary essay covers the period from 13 March 1918, when by a decree of the RSFSR SNK [Council of People's Commissars] major changes were set in the structure of the superior military command bodies and changes made in their personnel, to 10 July 1918, the day of the passage of the special decree by the 5th All-Russian Congress of Soviets entitled "On the Organization of the Red Army," and where the principles are outlined for its organizational development as a mass regular military organization of the Soviet state.

Prologue.

In the history of our motherland, February 1918* has become, as is known, one of the harshest. Under the pressure of the Kaiser's Troops, the old army worn down by the protracted war fled from the front. "...It could not help but flee in panic, taking with it the Red Army detachments,"¹ wrote V.I. Lenin at the beginning of March 1918. The expected help from the "world proletariat" did not materialize. It was essential to quickly conclude a peace treaty under disadvantageous conditions. L.D. Trotsky recalled how, in observing at that time the unskilled actions of the "staff" housed at Smolny, he commented to V.I. Lenin:

"Without serious and experienced military we will never get out of this chaos..."

"That is quite true. But they may not be loyal..."

"We can assign a commissar to each..."

"That would even be better than two," exclaimed Lenin, "and efficient ones. It cannot be that we do not have efficient communists!"²

Thus arose the structure of the Higher Military Council (VVS) which was established on 3 March. It included a military leader M.D. Bonch-Bruyevich (a major general from the old army) and the political commissars P.P. Proshyan (from the leftist SR's) and K.I. Shutko (from the Bolsheviks).

In the morning of the following day, V.I. Lenin had a talk with the military leader of the VVS. He was interested in his considerations on the remaining of the government in Petrograd due to the heightening military situation. Why was this necessary? Certainly the question of the move to Moscow had already been examined on 28 February at a session of the SNK. However, many residents of Petrograd had argued against the departure of the government and, correspondingly, the moving of

the capital and this included regular workers as well as party and state figures headed by the then chairman of the city soviet G.Ye. Zinovyev. At such a moment an additional authoritative argument for moving was in no way superfluous. Incidentally, judge for yourselves: we were able to discover in the TsGASA [Central State Archives of the Soviet Army] a brief report from the VVS military leader submitted at that time to Lenin at his request. Here it is:

"To the Chairman of the SNK

"The Germans have occupied Pskov and probably in the near future will become established in Narva. With such proximity of the enemy, I consider it essential to report that the government must now leave Petrograd, for example, for Moscow.

"The departure of the government at the given moment stems from the situation; a departure under the threat of the Germans would have the nature of flight and therefore be undesirable.

"4 March 1918. Petrograd.

"Member of the VVS, M. Bonch-Bruyevich."³

On 10 March 1918, at 2200 hours, by the special train No. 4001, V.I. Lenin, the members of the RKP(b) [Russian Communist Party (Bolshevik)] Central Committee and the SNK left Petrograd.

L.D. Trotsky was not aboard this train.

Why?

Possibly, Lenin was taking advantage of an occasion to rid himself of a government member who did not agree with his viewpoint over the question of peace. No, this was not Lenin's manner. Trotsky himself had retired from the post of people's commissar of foreign affairs. Under the conditions of signing a peace treaty, even the announcement of Trotsky's departure was devoid, in his expression, of "political sense."⁴

On the other hand, the leaving of Trotsky in Petrograd to a certain degree mitigated the impression of the departure of a majority of the state and party leaders from the city and we must not underestimate his authority in the masses. During the first months after October, he was one of the most active members of the Soviet government. On 12 March at a session of the Petrograd Soviet, G.Ye. Zinovyev who was not particularly sympathetic to Trotsky highly praised his activities and proposed he be elected chairman of the Military Revolutionary Commissariat of Petrograd. This was done and was approved by the city workers.⁵ But Trotsky spent just several days in the designated position.

On 14 March, on the day of the opening of the Fourth Extraordinary All-Russian Congress of Soviets in Moscow, the IZVESTIYA VTsIK published the following decree of the SNK. Let us quote it completely:

"Due to the petition from the member of the VVS, Comrade Shutko, on releasing him from the post held as member of the VVS, this petition is hereby satisfied. Comrade Trotsky is to be appointed a member of the VVS and carry out the duties of the chairman of this council.⁶

"Comrade Trotsky according to his petition is to be released from the position of people's commissar for foreign affairs. Comrade Chicherin is to be appointed the temporary deputy people's commissar for foreign affairs.

"Comrade Podvoyskiy, according to his petition, is to be released from the position of people's commissar for military affairs. Comrade Trotsky is to be appointed the people's commissar for military affairs.

"The position of Supreme Commander-in-Chief, according to the proposal made by Comrade Krylenko and the SNK, is to be abolished.

"Chairman of the SNK, V.I. Ulyanov (Lenin)
"People's Commissars V. Karelin, I. Stalin

"Moscow. 13 March 1918."

Need it be said that the changes effected caused a rather stormy response not only in Moscow and Petrograd, but also in the provinces and even abroad. Certainly they were the predecessor of major changes in Soviet military organization. The archives keep, for example, a tape of conversations over a direct wire from Petrograd to Moscow on 15 March. S.A. Balandin (the personal secretary of N.I. Podvoyskiy) invited to the phone a certain "Vanya" who we have not been able to identify but was evidently from the personnel of the All-Russian Collegium on the Organization of the Red Army, since through him members of this commission V.N. Krylenko and V.A. Trifonov were summoned for talks. Balandin asked about the "note" published the day before in IZVESTIYA, particularly being interested in "whether the statement about Podvoyskiy had been signed by Lenin." "Vanya" confirmed "the note [is] with the signature of Lenin and the other people's commissars, so we feel Podvoyskiy is retiring and is to remain a member of the collegium."⁷

We have dwelt on this fact since N.I. Podvoyskiy was one of the leading workers from the Narkomvoyen who then supported N.V. Krylenko in acting against the policy of developing a mass regular Red Army with the extensive use of old military specialists. The designated question is examined in detail in the works of the prominent specialist in the area of Soviet military development, Prof Yu.I. Korablev. This scientist, in particular, put into scholarly circulation such an important document as the statement of N.V. Krylenko of 4 March 1918 on his disagreement with the reform in the military directorate, that is, with the formation of the VVS which, as this Bolshevik since 1904 considered, "could cause only harm to the matter of establishing a new army and Soviet power generally."⁸ Here it was also stated that the

Narkomvoyen had set the goal of creating a small volunteer army "thoroughly democratic" with fully empowered soldier committees and this army would be available to the soviets which "themselves would determine the necessary contingent for their own oblast, they themselves would disband, reduce or, on the contrary, increase its size at the moment of revolutionary mobilization."⁹ Krylenko's request for retirement was discussed twice at sessions of the SNK. It was granted at the second session (9 March). On 13 March, Podvoyskiy's retirement was accepted.¹⁰

Consequently, one of the important reasons for the appointing of Trotsky as the people's commissar for military affairs was the absence at that moment of suitable candidates for this post from among the party military workers. The latter were fit only to destroy the old army. The Narkomvoyen had been unable to quickly organize troops for repelling the strong enemy. And plans for the future had nothing in common with the tasks of further ensuring the armed defense of the socialist fatherland under the conditions of a military threat from the powerful imperialist camp.

These tasks could be carried out only by a strong army which was well armed and led by professionally highly trained personnel and skilled specialists. On this point, the views of Lenin and Trotsky coincided. This is why V.I. Lenin, having sided with Ya.M. Sverdlov, strongly urged L.D. Trotsky long before the move to head up military affairs.

Over 10 years would pass and Trotsky would write in his memoirs: "Was I prepared for military work? Certainly not..."

"For us it was a matter of making a clean sweep of the vestiges of the old army and in its place under fire build a new one but for which plans could not yet be found in any book. This explains sufficiently why I have approached military work with uncertainty and agreed to it only because there was no one else to take charge. I did not consider myself a strategist in the slightest degree...."¹¹

The first days.

As the press stated, "The People's Commissar for the Military Ministry" L.D. Trotsky arrived in Moscow by a special train on 18 March. He drove from the station to the Loskutnaya Hotel, "where under his chairmanship an extraordinary session was held of the supreme military collegium."¹² The participants of this meeting are unknown. It can be assumed that of the members of the VVS only M.D. Bonch-Bruyevich and N.I. Podvoyskiy were present. Podvoyskiy had been appointed by the SNK literally on that very day in the place of P.P. Proshyan who had been expelled with the departure of the leftist SR's from the government.¹³ V.A. Trifonov participated from the members of the All-Russian College for the Organization of the Red Army. Moreover, it

was possibly attended by old military specialists from the personnel of the VVS and representatives of the Moscow Military District.

At this session which ended at night, Trotsky reported on his draft for reorganizing the army and this was to be submitted to the Soviet government. He called for an end to dilettantism and was in favor of introducing into the army the most recent achievements of military equipment and military art as well as instilling strictest discipline. The draft pointed out that the army must be organized not on volunteer bases but a person accepted for military service should be subordinate to all military laws. It was also recognized as essential that the army during the first 6 months after its organization be under marshal law in full combat readiness. There were plans to create an institution of regular officers and it was considered possible to accept regular officers of the old reserve for service. As for soldiers of the old reserve, they were to be immediately discharged. Subsequently, we will see that the basic provisions of this draft were unswervingly carried out.

The first workday at the people's commissariat began for Trotsky, however, with elementary domestic concerns as the military department urgently needed quarters. Noteworthy in this context is the document surviving in the archives:

"Order of the People's Commissariat for Military Affairs No. 1 of 19 March 1918

"I propose that the chief of the Main Billeting Directorate in an exceptional urgent manner begin repairing the former Aleksandrovskiy Military School and adapt it for the Commissariat for Military Affairs.

"All facilities and individuals are to unswervingly carry out all demand of the directorate chief involving this work

"People's Commissar for Military Affairs Trotsky

"Member of the Higher Military Council Podvoyskiy."¹⁴

As for the document which upon signing by the author was given number 2, it was a telegram to the Western Front which proposed "halting the breaking up of the billeting facilities."¹⁵ The coincidence is not accidental as telegram No. 2 could have been signed by Trotsky at the request of the chief of the Main Billeting Directorate when he was presented with Order No. 1.

An important event of 19 March was the Plenum of the Moscow Soviet where they discussed, in particular, the question of organizing the Red Army. The problem was that the decree of the session held 3 days prior to this of the Moscow Soviet Plenum had outlined the basic ways for resolving the given question. Among these were: developing agitation, the desirability of using the regular officers "under the supervision of political leaders who have the trust of the masses," working out disciplinary regulations and observing strict discipline, introducing

compulsory military service along with volunteer and so forth. But far from all agreed with this. The question was carried over to a plenary session. The speaker was the member of the Moscow Soviet Executive Committee, the Commissar for Military Affairs in Moscow Oblast Ye.M. Yaroslavskiy. He announced the existing differences, including on the questions of introducing universal military service and the immediate call-up of young persons of the 1918 induction year as well as the need to employ the military specialists. At this time at the presidium table, L.D. Trotsky turned up and gave a speech. Let us quote excerpts from this speech:

"Comrades, we need an army.... We must be strong with the current situation, when we are surrounded on all sides by rapacious imperialists both from the West and from the East....

"We cannot count solely on a revolt of the European proletariat. We must create an army which at the essential moment would be able to support the international movement of the proletariat with a firm hand....

"First of all, we should create a completely battleworthy, disciplined army in which we must have officers and generals.... All power in the army should belong to military leaders in the tactical and operational area, while political power in the army should be given over to the representatives of Soviet power who in the aim of supervising the command personnel will be positioned in the detachments.... The entire army should be completely permeated with the Soviet regime. Persons who are hostile to us in their political views may be invited in only to hold instructor positions....

"This army should have severe revolutionary discipline. We will limit the elective principle in the army and give the right to elect command personnel only for the inferior positions. Superior command personnel will be appointed by Soviet power and in a combat situation all orders of the military leaders should be carried out unswervingly...."¹⁶ The reader, it may be assumed, will not fail to note that Trotsky—the very same Trotsky who during the entire saga of the struggle for the Brest Peace did not cease hoping for an action by workers of other countries, this time, without in any way abandoning the idea of world revolution, tries to persuade us that the best support for the revolution would be the presence of a strong army of the Soviet nation. For the first time in a speech one hears the notion of political commissars as representatives of Soviet power in the army, the limiting of functions for persons hostile to the Soviets in their political views, and the differentiation of the electing of commanders. Also present in it are the notions of the forthcoming intense effort by the workers and the need for universal military instruction and so forth.

At 2000 hours on 19 March, the SNK discussed the question of the VVS. One scarcely need emphasize the

importance of this session. It was a matter of fundamentally new tasks and a new structure for that body which headed national defense. It was entrusted with the following task:

- "a) Giving basic assignments to the Military and Naval Departments on the defense of the state,
- b) Giving the defense departments assignments on organizing the armed forces of the nation (army and navy),
- c) Combining the activities of the army and navy and resolving all questions which are common to the Military and Naval Departments,
- d) Supervising the fulfillment by the defense departments of the tasks assigned to them,
- e) Systematic collection of factual information about all of military, on their knowledge and the combat experience of those fit for the position of superior military command."¹⁷

Already the bringing together in a single body of the functions of supreme command over all the armed forces necessitated changes in the personnel of the VVS. According to the decree, it was to be headed by the people's commissar for military affairs (the solely-responsible commander), and include the people's commissar for naval affairs and the member of the collegium of the Narkomvoyen, as well as two military specialists and one naval specialist who possessed military knowledge and experience. The SNK decree was signed by Lenin. As for the specific individuals, at that moment they were L.D. Trotsky, N.I. Podvoyskiy and M.D. Bonch-Bruyevich. In addition, a decision was taken to appoint deputies for the first two (E.M. Sklyanskiy and K.A. Mekhonoshin) and incorporate two political commissars in the VVS.¹⁸ Consequently, the members of the collegium of the Narkomvoyen who accepted the new program not only remained in place but also were included in the supreme military command body.

Among these persons, the chairman of the VVS and subsequently of the RVS valued E.M. Sklyanskiy more than the others. In his memoirs, Trotsky pointed out that he never regretted his appointment as his deputy upon the recommendation of Ya.M. Sverdlov, regardless of the fact that in 1918 Sklyanskiy was just 26 years old.

"He stood out in his professionalism, diligence and the ability to judge people and circumstances, that is, those qualities which make up an administrator.... Like any serious and firm administrator, he had many enemies. His gifted but irritated many respected mediocrities. Stalin egged them on behind the scenes. Sklyanskiy was attacked underhandedly, particularly in my absence."¹⁹

We have described only certain moments in the first days related to the activity of the new peoples commissar and his stay in Moscow. At this time, one can notice the subordination of everything to one goal: the testing out of the draft for the further organization of the Red Army in various audiences (from a narrow meeting to a

plenum of the Moscow Soviet and a SNK session) and to achieve the organizing of the necessary personnel to implement what had been planned. But this was just the beginning.

Each citizen—a worker and a soldier

In taking up Trotsky's draft and the measures carried out by him, we are far from trying to show him as the "prophet" of some completely new military policy of the Soviet state (one must not create idols!). Trotsky had a good knowledge of the works of Marx and Engels, he highly regarded Lenin, he heeded his opinions on military questions and generally followed both the methodological provisions of Marxism as well as Lenin's ideas, making, certainly, his own contribution to the elaboration of the theory and practice of Soviet military organizational development.

On 21 March, L.D. Trotsky and N.I. Podvoyskiy signed the Appeal of the Narkomvoyen "Our Task" which was published in PRAVDA 3 days later. This emphasized the necessity of "ensuring the armed defense of the Soviet republic" and contained specific instructions aimed at carrying out this task, and in particular, the following:

"During these frightening days, each honest citizen should become a worker and a soldier. In the near future, a law on universal obligatory training in military affairs will be introduced. The republic entrusts to the experienced instructors the duty of making each citizen in the city and countryside capable at the first summons of coming to the defense of the motherland with weapons in hand.

"Instruction in military affairs will be carried out outside of ordinary working hours. No one has the right to demand any compensation whatsoever for those hours which he devotes to the superior civil duty of learning the art of defending the Soviet republic."²⁰

Let us point out that the bourgeoisie in their revolutions had also come out with the slogan of the "universal arming of the people." It was also advantageous to the proletariat in a common human sense (one of the democratic freedoms) as well as the practical one (the workers obtained arms to struggle for their own interests). It is no accident that this slogan as a common democratic demand was incorporated in all the socialist programs, including in the ones drawn up by the founders of scientific socialism. It never defined the forms of the military organization but always provided not only for the arming of the people but also their instruction in military affairs.

Lenin, during the first days after October, stated the loyalty of the Bolsheviks to their program demands. In editing the Decree on the Organization of the Worker-Peasant Red Army (RKKa) on 15 January, Lenin did not cross out the provision for "arming of all the people."²¹ Trotsky was present here and did not argue since at the Third All-Russian Congress of Soviets, when Lenin on 11 January stated that agitation directed

against the exploiters "would create a socialist Red Army and what all socialists had endeavored, the universal arming of the people."²² This was not a deviation from Marxism and from the demands of the program and certainly did not deny universal instruction in military affairs for the workers. On this, as we see, the opinions of Lenin and Trotsky converged: the army of workers and peasants in which each worker could join in its social essence was also the universal arming of the people in the form of a regular military organization.

The members of the Narkomvoyen Collegium thought differently before the arrival of Trotsky. Here is an excerpt from a document signed on 4 March 1918 by N.V. Krylenko, N.I. Podvoyskiy and I.P. Dzevyaltovskiy (the chief commissar of military schools), an appeal published on 5 March in the newspaper RABOCHAYA I KRESTYANSKAYA KRASNAYA ARMIYA I FLOT: "One of the conditions for peace is a complete demobilization of our army. We will replace this with universal instruction for each and every one in handling weapons. Each worker, each peasant should be able to shoot. From a rifle, from a revolver, from a machine gun." Then came the announcement of the opening up of courses for training soldiers in all types of weapons as well as firing ranges. In the given instance the provision on complete demobilization was understood as the disbanding of the old and new armies and these would be replaced by universal military instruction. For Lenin and Trotsky, the latter provided an opportunity to train reserves for the army. Here is what Trotsky said in the course of a lecture given in Moscow on 21 April 1918: "...The Army now is not thousands and ten thousands of Red Armymen who are presently under arms and who need discipline and training but rather an army is all the working people, it is the enormous reserves of trained workers at the plants in the cities and peasants in the villages.

"...We, on the one hand, are establishing the Red Army and, on the other, are introducing universal training for all workers and peasants who do not exploit the labor of others. We for now are introducing this restriction. We do not want to arm the bourgeoisie. At present, we will not issue rifles to the bourgeoisie and to the exploiters who have not abandoned their rights to private property."²³

The value of this statement is not only and not so much in defining the role of Vsevobuch [Universal Military Training] as a reserve for filling out the army. This clearly formulates the class principle which should be observed in organizing military instruction.

On 22 April, the most important decrees related to the organization of the Red Army were discussed at a plenary session of the VTsIK. In the general report of the Narkomvoyen, a description was given for each of the documents, proceeding from the situation and the tasks of strengthening national defense. Trotsky prepared the draft of the decree on compulsory training in military art. He explained to the VTsIK members why military

instruction was to be introduced only for the workers and peasants who did not exploit the labor of others. The draft stated directly that "to arm the bourgeoisie would mean to incorporate an ongoing internecine struggle within the army and thereby paralyze its strength in fighting against the external enemies."²⁴ In speaking about the enormous principles significance of the decree, Trotsky emphasized:

"This decree, if you will approve it in law, establishes an obligation for all citizens and all classes who hold power in their hands to make to the people, to the state, to that regime which they are defending the highest payment in their blood and with their life. Military obligations for those from 19 to 40 years of age should be approved as an obligatory provision. Those who undergo certain schooling in military art, those who are considered sufficiently healthy to dedicate 8 weeks a year with 12 hours per week, 96 hours over a year and a certain number of hours with repeat call-ups, this person is thereby obligated upon summons of Soviet power to take to the colors for repelling external enemies. This is the basic idea of the given decree."²⁵

Due to the organizing of Vsevobuch, the workers were able to obtain military training without leaving their job or their family.

The class approach to organizing military instruction was contested by the Menshevik leaders. L. Martov expressed the hope that the provision that the "Menshevik workers would not be armed was a mild joke," and proposed that the refusal to provide weapons training for that 5-10 percent of the population which was parasites and exploiters clearly represented an unserious attitude toward the question.²⁶ F.I. Dan was even sharper: "To say that if the bourgeoisie is eliminated from instruction this will be a guarantee that the army will be purely proletarian is laughable."²⁷ Trotsky soundly replied to many comments and proposals (in particular, on the insufficient time for training and so forth), but rejected the Menshevik rebukes, giving such arguments:

"You argue against the noninstruction of the bourgeoisie and you point out that it is so few in numbers (some 5 percent of the entire population) and that for the army it cannot represent any danger.... But this is not the issue at all. You are well aware that the bourgeoisie has a large following of unenlightened, dark Philistines who are poisoned by the petty bourgeois element. You are well aware that at present with the current situation we could not include them in the army because this would require the use of the cruelest, bloody repression. In order to win them over to our side, we must make the first major victory in the organizational area. We must demonstrate to these obscure, confused and deceived elements that worker power is capable of building a new economy in the interests of the people and creating an army for the sake of defending those same interests. Then they will see for themselves that the new regime is working for

them. Then we need not fear that in incorporating them in the army, we are planting the germ of civil war in the army."²⁸

A little more than a year passed and on 25 May 1919, at the celebration of Vsevoluch, V.I. Lenin said: "Today's holiday shows what successes we have achieved and what new strength is growing in the heart of the working class."²⁹

By this time, of the 2.2 million persons subject to instruction, already 813,546 are already trained and 750,805 are continuing instruction.

We will create firm, dependable cadres

The above-mentioned appeal of the Narkomvoyen "Our Task" also contained instructions that universal military training alone was not sufficient for the defense of the Soviet republic. "In order at the moment of an alarm that all armed citizens can come to the defense of the nation," it pointed out, "it is essential to create firm, reliable cadres. This is an immediate task for the next few months and weeks. The Soviet republic which is surrounded by enemies is to begin immediately to organize battalions from the most stalwart and dedicated fighters. Their existence and the existence of their families will be taken care of out of public funds. The Soviet cadres should be united by iron discipline, they should be trained, equipped and armed in the last word of military art."³⁰ In other words, the Red Army should be established as a professional regular armed force considering all achievements of military affairs. The Red Guard detachments, the plant and peasant militia (irregular troops) could successfully handle the internal enemies, but a modern army was essential to fight against the troops of world imperialism.

This also was no discovery of Trotsky's. Let us recall the model provided by F. Engels in 1851 for the armed forces of the proletariat in the event of the victory of the revolution in one country as depicted in the work "Possibilities and Prospects of a War of the Holy Alliance Against France in 1852": a proletarian guard in the cities and a peasant guard in the villages "for standing interior service" and a regular army "against invasion."³¹ K. Marx also wrote about the necessity of the working class to have its own army and without this he could not conceive of a dictatorship of the proletariat. Well known is the striking phrase of V.I. Lenin who on 23 February 1918 wrote that we must be concerned with "creating a serious, democratic and mighty army."³² As for the full support of the Red Armymen and their families (the support of the army by state funds was one of the most important features of a regular army", this was envisaged in the regulations worked out at a meeting of the Narkomvoyen Collegium with V.I. Lenin on 22 December 1917. This was examined in detail also in the draft "Manifesto on a Socialist War" presented at a session of the SNK on 23 December and subsequently incorporated in all documents concerning the organization of the RKKA, including the Decree of 15 January 1918.

The "Manifesto" for the first time also emphasized the necessity of centralism in military command and control. This also was an important feature for regular armed forces. Consequently, from the second half of December 1917, in the process of seeking out ways for organizing a new army, already the documents began depicting the line of establishing a regular, professional army.

Then how was the question to be settled of manning the armed forces? A regular army can be a volunteer one, one consisting of mercenaries, that is, citizens of other countries, as well as constituted as a result of universal mobilizations or by recruiting. But for achieving a mass nature, Marx and Engels considered universal military conscription as the optimum version (all the more as this corresponded to the political slogan to the "Universal Arming of the People"). Under the conditions of the unusual fatigue of the masses in the imperialist war, under the conditions of expecting peace and the struggle for it in Russia after October 1917, it is possible to speak about the manning of the new army solely on volunteer principles. This was understood by everyone: by both Lenin and Trotsky, by the members of the Narkomvoyen Collegium and by the old military specialists who had come over to the Soviet side.

However, in the statement by Krylenko and others volunteering was viewed not only as a compulsory measure but also as a prospect for military organizational development. Lenin, Trotsky and the old military specialists thought otherwise. Even in the draft of the Manifesto, one of the authors of which had been Maj Gen S.I. Odintsov, there was the provision that "volunteers who have served prior to 20 January 1918 and who have remained in service in operational units before the signing of the peace treaty, in the event of their desire in demobilization of the army, can be released from military service forever."³³ Certainly in the future, the introduction of military conscription was envisaged. V.I. Lenin in editing the decree on the formation of the RKKA in two places crossed out the word "volunteers" as the decree defined the principles of military organizational development not for a short period of time. Trotsky was present here and did not argue. We have used this phrase a second time because if Trotsky did not agree, he would have argued as at that time everyone could voice his opinion (certainly if one had one).

As is known, on 15 March, M.D. Bonch-Bruyevich on behalf of the first membership of the VVS submitted to the SNK a plan for organizing a RKKA with 1.5 million persons with the introduction of the principle of compulsory military service. But at this period, it was premature.

On 22 March 1918, Red Army day was held everywhere. At the meetings convened the speakers explained the existing situation and called for the filling out of the ranks of the armed forces. In a speech by Trotsky in the Aleksyevskiy People's Home, he pointed out:

"Due to the approach of spring and the related field work, at present a universal mobilization cannot be carried out. At present, we must limit ourselves to introducing universal compulsory training in military affairs and the organizing of combat volunteer detachments which will serve as the skeleton for a new mass army."³⁴

So be it. But for now a mass army was still to be organized. Even the Decree of 22 April "On Compulsory Training in Military Art" contained the provision that "The Worker and Peasant Government of the Republic sets as its immediate task the involving of all citizens in universal labor and military conscription." In speaking on this day at a session of the VTsIK, Trotsky drew attention to the fact that in addition to the objective reason (field work) there was also a number of subjective ones which also prevented an immediate transition to universal military conscription, including the attitude of the working masses, the absence of the required amount of command personnel and the military headquarters bodies on the spot. In terms of the latter, he, in particular, said:

"In order to move from conditions of volunteers to conditions of compulsory military service, it is essential to have a military administrative apparatus for registering the available personnel who should be liable for military service. At present, we do not have such an apparatus. The old apparatus was destroyed, together with the entire apparatus of bureaucracy while the new one is just being created now in the form of the county, district and provincial commissariats which are being formed by the corresponding soviets on the spot..."³⁵

The transition to universal military service in the historical literature is frequently linked to the revolt of the Czechoslovak Corps and because of this the VTsIK supposedly was forced on 29 May to adopt a decree on compulsory recruitment into the RKKA. However, of equal significance was the exacerbation of the class struggle in the countryside related to starvation.³⁶ The decree stated directly that "the transition from a volunteer army to universal mobilization of the workers and poorest peasants is imperatively dictated by the entire situation in the nation, both for struggling for bread as well as for repelling the counterrevolution which has arisen on the grounds of hunger; both domestic and external."³⁷ This transition, it was assumed, had to commence "on the one hand, from the most threatened areas and, on the other, from the main centers of the worker movement." Judging from the document, the Don and Kuban areas were considered "threatened areas" while Moscow and Petrograd were the centers of the worker movement. The plan for compulsory recruitment was to be worked out in such a manner that there would be least disruption in the "course of production and social life in the designated areas and cities."³⁸ Only on 11 June did the SNK issue the Decree on Calling Up Workers and Peasants Who Did Not Exploit the Labor of Others in 51 counties of Volga, Ural and Western Siberian Military

Districts where actions had been initiated by the White Czechs supported by the internal counterrevolution.

The Fifth All-Russian Congress of Soviets on 10 July welcomed the call-up of workers of two age groups in Moscow and Petrograd and the start of mobilization in the Volga and Urals. In the report at the congress of the People's Commissar Trotsky, it was again emphasized: volunteers "were not the principle which we defended and carried out. This was a necessary compromise measure at the given moment, as there was no other way out." Moreover, it was "in a fundamental contradiction with the tasks of building up a real worker and peasant army."

"Universal military service is the required regime for the age of a peaceful democratic system..." But under the conditions of a fierce class struggle, the main principle is: "We are including workers and peasants in our army and our army is a reflection of the soviets, a reflection of the All-Russian Congress of Soviets."³⁹

Let us recall that Article 19 of the RSFSR Constitution adopted at the congress proclaimed:

"In the aims of the greatest possible defense of the victories of the Great Worker-Peasant Revolution, the Russian socialist federative Soviet Republic recognizes the duty of all citizens of the republic to defend the socialist fatherland and establishes universal military obligation. The honorable right to defend the revolution with weapons in hand is granted only to workers; the nonlabor elements are to be sent to different military obligations."⁴⁰

Footnotes

* From February 1918, all dates are given according to the new style.

1. V.I. Lenin, PSS [Complete Collected Works], Vol 35, p 419.

2. "L.D. Trotskiy o Lenine. Materialy dlya biografi" [L.D. Trotsky on Lenin. Materials for a Biographer]. Moscow, Gosizdat, 2d Edition, 1924, p 76.

3. TsGASA [Central State Archives of the Soviet Army], folio 3, inv. 1, file 78, sheet 123.

4. L. Trotsky, "Moya zhizn. Opyt avtobiografii" [My Life. Attempt at an Autobiography]. Berlin, 1930, Part II, p 71.

5. At the session of the Petrograd Executive Committee, this election had occurred the day before.

6. On 14 March, the position of chairman of the VVS officially did not yet exist. It was introduced by a SNK decree of 19 March 1918.

7. TsGASA, folio 1, inv. 1, file 55, sheet 149.

8. See: Yu.I. Korablev, "V.I. Lenin i zaschita zavoyevaniy Velikogo Otkryabrya" [V.I. Lenin and the Defense

of the Victories of Great October], Moscow, Nauka, 2d Revised and Supplemented Edition, 1979, p 251.

9. Ibid.

10. As for the remaining members of the Collegium of the Military Commissariat with the rank of people's commissars, V.A. Antonov-Ovseyenko, for example, by a decree of the Central Executive Committee of Ukrainian Soviets was appointed Supreme Commander-in-Chief of all its troops; P.Ye. Dybenko on 13 March participated in a meeting of military workers under the chairmanship of V.I. Lenin, and on 15 March his personal file was reviewed at a session of the VKP(b) Central Committee in line with the accusation by commissars from the Narva detachments of unjustified abandoning of Narva and other infractions. In mid-March Dybenko left the government as a sign of protest against the concluding of the Brest Peace. At that time he was arrested. As a result of an investigation and court trial, the Revolutionary Tribunal in May 1918 considered Dybenko justified.

11. L. Trotsky, "Moya zhizn....," Part II, pp 72-73.

12. IZVESTIYA YUGA, 22 March 1918.

13. P.P. Proshyan on 10 April 1918 was again included in the VVS and remained there until 6 July, that is, until the start of the revolt by the leftist SR's.

14. TsGASA, folio 1, inv. 1, file 37, sheet 212.

15. Ibid., sheet 213.

16. Quoted in: GOLOS TRUDOVOGO KRESTYANSTVA, 25 March 1918; IZVESTIYA YUGA, 23 March 1918.

17. "Dekrety Sovetskoy vlasti" [Decrees of Soviet Power], Moscow, Gospolitizdat, Vol II, 1959, p 570.

18. Subsequently, the membership of the VVS occurred as follows. From 1 April, Ye.I. Berens began working as a naval specialist, from 10 April, P.P. Proshyan, from 14 May, V.A. Antonov-Ovseyenko, and from 4 June, N.M. Potapov (the second specialist in military affairs). L.D. Trotsky became the people's commissar for naval affairs in April. "The appointing of me as the naval commissar certainly was of purely political significance," he explained and then pointed to the task set for him by the SNK of "attracting all of the necessary forces which under the current, most difficult conditions, could do everything possible for saving and reorganizing our naval forces" ("Grazhdanskaya voyna i voyennaya interventsia v SSSR: Entsiklopediya" [The Civil War and Military Intervention in the USSR: Encyclopedia], Moscow, 1983, p 138; IZVESTIYA VTsIK, 9 April 1918).

19. L. Trotsky, "Moya zhizn....," Part II, pp 83-84.

20. PRAVDA, 24 March 1918.

21. "Dekrety Sovetskoy vlasti," Moscow, Gospolitizdat, Vol I, 1957, p 352.

22. V.I. Lenin, PSS, Vol 35, p 270.

23. L.D. Trotsky, "Sovetskaya vlast i mezhdunarodnyy imperializm. Lektsiya pročitannaya v Moskve 21 aprelya 1918 goda" [Soviet Power and International Imperialism. A Lecture Given in Moscow on 21 April 1918], Petrograd, 1918, p 16.

24. "Dekrety Sovetskoy vlasti," Moscow, Gospolitizdat, Vol II, 1959, p 152.

25. IZVESTIYA VTsIK, 23 April 1918.

26. Ibid., 24 April 1918.

27. Ibid.

28. Ibid.

29. V.I. Lenin, PSS, Vol 38, p 383.

30. PRAVDA, 24 March 1918.

31. K. Marx and F. Engels, "Soch." [Works], Vol 7, p 518.

32. V.I. Lenin, PSS, Vol 35, p 368.

33. TsGASA, folio 11, inv. 5, file 1125, sheet 76.

34. PRAVDA, 23 March 1918.

35. IZVESTIYA VTsIK, 23 April 1918.

36. Even on 20 May, the VTsIK in following up a report by Ya.M. Sverdlov approved a resolution on the tasks of the Soviets in the countryside, where they pointed to the extreme urgency of uniting the working peasantry against the village bourgeoisie and the necessity of arming all the poor peasantry and achieving their dictatorship.

37. "Dekrety Sovetskoy vlasti," Vol II, p 334.

38. Ibid., p 335.

39. L. Trotsky, "Organizatsiya Krasnoy Armii: Doklad na V Vserossiyskom syezde Sovetov" [Organization of the Red Army: Report at the 5th All-Russian Congress of Soviets], Moscow, 1918, pp 6, 10, 11.

40. "Dekrety Sovetskoy vlasti," Vol II, pp 553-554.

(Conclusion Follows)

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"It Is Impossible to Build an Army Without Repression..." L. Trotsky

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[Materials compiled by Col A.Ya. Ponomarev: "It Is Impossible to Build an Army Without Repression..." L. Trotsky; the title comes from: L.D. Trotsky, "Moya zhizn" [My Life], Berlin, Vol 2, 1930, p 141]

[Text] In our days, the days of the manifesting of enormous interest in history and the active analysis of its "blank spots," when much is being written and said about the past, the readers frequently ask questions concerning the life of political figures, particularly those who "made" the revolution. Among the most frequently mentioned names is L.D. Trotsky. Recently, many articles about him have appeared in the periodical press.

The entire life of Trotsky was a struggle and his deeds were primarily subordinate to one goal of winning leadership in the party. He must be evaluated as an aggregate, but primarily as a political leader who held one or another post in the government.

In holding the post of chairman of the RVSR [Republic Revolutionary Military Council], he did not alter his views and positions, often expressing his disagreement with one or another party decision, including on military questions. For example, he made a statement to the RKP(b) [Russian Communist Party (Bolshevik)] Central Committee in which he protested a Central Committee decision (of 15 June 1919), asserting that this included whims and mischief. This occurred at the very intense moment for the young Soviet Republic, when the party and government, being alarmed by the situation arising in troop leadership, were forced to take emergency measures for a certain reorganization of military command and control.

Vladimir Ilich [Lenin] wrote to the RKP(b) Central Committee on the question of this statement: "Comrade Trotsky is in error: neither whims, neither mischief, neither caprices, neither confusion, neither desperation nor the 'element' of those adopted (Trotsky is showing the terrible irony of the scourged) qualities are to be found here. But there is what Trotsky has overlooked: a majority of the Central Committee is convinced that the headquarters is a 'den of thieves' and that at headquarters things are not going well but a definite step has been taken in the search for a major improvement in the search for the means of a fundamental change. That is the whole thing. Moscow, 17 June 1919."¹

On 15 January 1918, the SNK [Council of People's Commissars] under the chairmanship of V.I. Lenin adopted the Decree on Founding the Worker-Peasant Red Army [RKKA] and on 29 January, the Decree for Organizing the Worker-Peasant Red Navy. On 10 July 1918, the Fifth All-Russian Congress of Soviets adopted the Decree "On the Organizational Development of the

Red Army" and this approved the measures of the RKP(b) Central Committee and the Soviet government on establishing a regular army. The congress set the task of extensively preparing command personnel from among the workers and peasants (the decision to involve in the work the military specialists of the old Russian Army was a forced and temporary measures).

In speaking to students (officer candidates) of military courses on Red Officer Day on 24 November 1918, V.I. Lenin said: "...In building up a new army, we should take commanders only from the people. Only Red officers will have authority among the soldiers and be able to strengthen socialism in our army. Such an army will be invincible."³

Individual authors writing about Trotsky have incorrectly asserted that there was a unity of views between Lenin and Trotsky over the question of employing the military specialists. In contrast to L.D. Trotsky who expressed complete confidence in them, V.I. Lenin, in drawing attention to the fact that without the experience and knowledge of the old Tsarist specialists, it was impossible to build communism "with the hands of clean communists," and said at the 8th Party Congress: "...We have resorted to the aid of bourgeois specialists who are completely permeated with bourgeois psychology and who have betrayed us and will betray us for years to come...organizational creative close work should confine the bourgeois specialists so that they will march in the ranks of the proletariat, no matter how they may resist or struggle each step of the way...."⁴

The congress legislated the introduction of the institution of military commissars in the Army and Navy, having given them special powers.

In giving a report at the All-Russian Congress of Military Commissars on 7 June 1918, L.D. Trotsky particularly emphasized their rights: "...If a commissar notices that a military leader is threatening danger to the revolution, the commissar has the right to mercilessly deal with the counterrevolutionary, even up to the point of execution."⁵

In the telegram (No. 341 of 20 December 1918) from Lashevich and Alafuz to Trotsky, there are the following words: "...The chairman of the Revolutionary Committee Trotsky has proposed executing the commissars on the front with disturbances and revolts and I propose that we should first execute those who prepare these revolts by sabotage consciously in the rear...."⁶ This document shows directly that he executed commissars.

Executed! This word was used rather frequently by Trotsky.

A feeling of love for others was alien to Trotsky! He was egoistic and cruel to the extreme, and he considered the death penalty one of the main ways and methods of maintaining the combat capability and readiness of the Red Army. It was no accident, in leaving for Kazan, on

the very first day of the trip, as M. Glazman recalled, Trotsky organized a Revolutionary Tribunal consisting of three men on his train.⁷

In being profoundly aware that an army was strong in its discipline which in turn was based on ideas that elevated the soul, Trotsky wrote: "...An army is not created out of fear. The Tsarist Army disintegrated not because of a shortage of repression. In endeavoring to save it by restoring the death penalty, Kerensky merely dealt it the final blow. In the ashes of the great war, the Bolsheviks created a new army. Anyone who understands the language of history even slightly will realize that these facts do not require an explanation. The ideas of the October Revolution were the strongest cement of the new army."⁸

A fine, sensible idea but what about deeds? "It is impossible to organize an army without repression. It is impossible to lead masses of people to their death without having the death penalty available to the command. As long as those evil tailless apes named man who are so proud of their equipment will organize armies and fight, the command will put the soldiers between a possible death ahead and an inevitable death behind."⁹

This thesis carried out by Trotsky was confirmed by hundreds of documents signed by him at different times and a portion of these we now offer the reader.

Who was he, this Lev Davydovich Trotsky?

His real name was Leyba (Lev) Davidovich Bronshteyn, he was born on 7 November 1879 in a prosperous family in the small town of Yanovka near Kherson. He had a secondary education. He was murdered on 20 August 1940 at a villa in Coyoacan (Mexico).

The first ambitious dream of this man was to become a writer. As a student, he joined a group of bohemian radicals. At age 17 arrest followed for disseminating radical literature. Along with hundreds of other students he was exiled to Siberia for 4 years (before being sent there he spent around 2 years in the Odessa Prison, 3 months in Kherson and the same period of time at the Moscow Deporting Prison). He spent about 2 years in the village of Ust-Kut in Irkutsk Province.

In the autumn of 1902, he escaped from Siberia to the Ukraine, and then moved to Austria. He established himself in Vienna. A false passport was made out in the name of Trotsky. Subsequently, he moved to London. Lev Davydovich Trotsky spent a larger part of his life overseas, playing the role of an agitator among the Russian emigre socialists, representatives of different nationalities and was a secret conspirator acting against the Bolsheviks. During that period, evidently there was a final rupture of relations with his relatives who remained in Russia. The archives hold a document which confirms this fact:

"A Jew disavows Trotsky (the right of denunciation)

"The father invokes a curse.

"The Berlin correspondent of the DAILY EXPRESS described a dramatic rite in a synagogue in Yekaterinoslav in the south of Russia, where the Rabbi, at the request of Trotsky's father, excommunicated Trotsky from Judaism, invoking an eternal curse on him.

"The old partially-blind father of Trotsky was led to the altar by his sons-in-law and solemnly began to accuse his son of being an enemy of Judaism and the scourge of mankind. He stated that all Russians and the entire world should be his witnesses. During this Trotsky's mother fainted but, coming to, joined the other relatives in eternal renunciation of Trotsky."¹⁰

During the first months of 1903, L.D. Trotsky was an active member of the editorial staff of the Marxist newspaper ISKRA which was published by V.I. Lenin in London. After the split in the Russian Marxist movement which occurred in the summer of 1903, Trotsky sided with the political opponents of Lenin, the Mensheviks. He traveled around Europe, he spent time in Brussels, Paris, Liege as well as in Switzerland and Germany. Everywhere that colonies of the Russian radical students could be found, he made attacks on Lenin and other Bolsheviks who were calling for the establishment of a disciplined party capable of directing the struggle against Tsarism.

Trotsky returned to Russia in 1905 and became one of the leaders of the St. Petersburg Soviet which was controlled by the Mensheviks. In the feverish atmosphere of intrigue, intense political conflicts and struggle for power he felt like a fish in water. From the age of 26, he believed that it was his calling to be the leader of the Russian revolution.

After the failure of the 1905 Revolution, L.D. Trotsky was again arrested. In February 1907, he was exiled to Obdorsk but soon thereafter escaped. Again a series of cities and countries: St. Petersburg, Finland, Sweden, England and finally Austria.

Settling again overseas, Trotsky established his political staff in Vienna. In attacking Lenin, he endeavored to establish his own movement and proposed himself as a "revolutionary internationalist."

The former Vice Consul of Great Britain in Moscow, R.H. Bruce Lockhart (an agent of diplomatic intelligence from that state), in his memoirs "An English Agent," described how the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of his country was vitally interested in the differences between Lenin and Trotsky, differences on which the British government placed great hopes.¹¹

In 1916, L.D. Trotsky was sent from Paris to Spain. At the end of December, he embarked from Barcelona by steamer for America and at the beginning of January arrived in New York.

The collapse of the Tsarist regime found Trotsky in New York, where he was editing a Russian radical newspaper

NOVYY MIR in collaboration with his friend N. Bukharin who was as rabid an opponent of Lenin as Trotsky.

L.D. Trotsky arrived in Petrograd in May directly from the Halifax Prison where he had spent a month in jail and had been released with the permission of the English government which was granting the request of the Russian Provisional Government. Initially, he endeavored to establish his own revolutionary party, a bloc of former emigres and leftist elements from different radical parties, but, having realized that the revolutionary masses were supporting the Bolsheviks, in August 1917, after 14 years of opposing Lenin and his followers, Trotsky submitted a request to join the Bolshevik party.

The situation in the nation required a unity of party ranks and Lenin understood this as no one else. Trotsky's petition was granted. He became chairman of the Petrograd Soviet and with the formation of the first Soviet government held the position of commissar of foreign affairs. Precisely he was entrusted with heading the peace delegation in Brest.

However, although L.D. Trotsky knew that the Russian Army could not fight any more, he steadily refused to sign the peace with Germany supposedly on the grounds that the signing of such a peace would betray the world revolution. Lenin very sharply criticized Trotsky's conduct at Brest-Litovsk, considering that his proposals to halt the war, the refusal to sign the peace and demobilize the army were worse than insanity.

Later, L.D. Trotsky himself admitted that he had acted incorrectly. After the Germans invaded the Soviet nation and began to threaten Petrograd he stated: "I consider it my duty to say at this authoritative assembly that at the hour when many of us, myself included, doubted whether the signing of the truce in Brest-Litovsk was admissible, only Comrade Lenin, showing amazing foresight, stubbornly and regardless of our resistance asserted that this was essential...and now we must recognize that we were not right."¹²

In relying on facts, M. Sayers and A. Kahn in their book "The Secret War Against Soviet Russia" have pointed out that Trotsky's behavior at Brest was not the only instance of the manifesting of opposition actions. While L.D. Trotsky was "agitating" in Brest, his closest associate N. Kristinskiy publically attacked Lenin, calling for the waging of a revolutionary war not only against German imperialism and the Russian bourgeoisie but also against that portion of the proletariat led by Lenin. At the same time, another associate of Trotsky who was part of the opposition, N. Bukharin, proposed a resolution adopted at a meeting of a group of "leftist communists." It, in particular, stated: "In the interests of international revolution, we consider it advisable to accept the possibility of the loss of Soviet power which has now become merely formal."¹³

From the documents it is clear that the opposition members secretly intended to split the Bolshevik party,

overthrow Lenin and create a new government. This was later recognized by Bukharin himself.

From 14 March 1918, L.D. Trotsky, the acting chairman of the Higher Military Council of the Republic (VVSR) (on the same day the SNK had released him from the position of people's commissar for foreign affairs), was the people's commissar for military affairs. On 2 September 1918, the Higher Military Council and the Collegium for Military and Naval Affairs were abolished and in their place a single body was established for managing the Armed Forces, the RVSR.

L.D. Trotsky was appointed the people's commissar for military and naval affairs as well as the chairman of the RVSR.

In organizing the defense of the socialist fatherland and in establishing the Red Army for this, the Communist Party and the Soviet government constantly relied on the revolutionary enthusiasm and class awareness of the workers and laboring peasantry. This is how Trotsky understood this. A telegram to the Vologda Provincial Military Committee of 4 August 1918: "I propose reminding all the soviet institutions that Vologda is under marshal law. There should be exemplary order everywhere, particularly in the military institutions and troop units. The merciless eradication of counterrevolutionaries and the imprisonment of suspicious persons in concentration camps are an essential condition for success.

"Inattentiveness, negligence and particularly cowardice shown by the Soviet representatives, particularly the military, will be viewed as treachery. Self-seekers will be executed regardless of previous contributions."¹⁴

Throughout the nation in all areas, practical measures were being carried out to defend the victories of the revolution and preparations were underway for the forthcoming 5th All-Russian Congress of Soviets (it opened on 4 June 1918). Here they planned to discuss the question of organizing the Red Army and enormous attention was paid to mass agitation work. On this question V.I. Lenin wrote to G.Ye. Zinovyev on 14 June 1918: "It is essential to make every effort to immediately send hundreds of agitators from Petrograd to the countryside. Before the Congress of Soviets this is extremely important and the entire military and food situation demand this even more...."¹⁵

But the document signed by the RVSR Chairman L.D. Trotsky were terse and were similar to sentences. Thus, an unique response to information on the apprehending of several officers and soldiers of different nationalities who had had contact with French agents was the document entitled "Warning" over Trotsky's signature and the second point of this stated: "Any person who sells out to foreign imperialists for participation in revolts or for occupying Russian territory is to be punished by death."¹⁶

Trotsky's activities during the years of the intervention of the imperialist states and the Civil War are termed the high point in his career. However, precisely at that time one can see with particular force those qualities in him such as cruelty and immoderate self-certainty and precisely at that time he frequently acted arbitrarily. On 30 May 1919 during a sharp deterioration in the situation on the Southern Front (in the Millerovo area), V.I. Lenin telephoned L.D. Trotsky: "Extremely bothered by your silence at a moment when, according to information, although not completely verified, the breach on the Millerovo axis is growing. What measures have been taken to prevent the enemy from linking up with the foreigners?"¹⁷

In reading the texts of speeches by Trotsky to the masses of soldiers as well as the orders and telegrams signed by him, in their majority we encounter words which have a hint of intimidation and direct warnings about the employment of extreme measures.

In a telegram from the Narkomvoenput [People's Commissariat for Military Communications] to Comrade Ledovskiy of 2 October 1918 over the question of abuses by military representatives, the RVSR chairman demands precise data and promises: "...In the event of concrete instructions I will always apply measures of harsh retribution!"¹⁸ Or the following order¹⁹:

"Olkhovatka. To the Commander of the Volchansk Regiment. Copy. Podgornoye. To Brigade Commander Usov. Copy. Voronezh. To the Chief of the Division Vedenyayev

No. 145

Order

"The Volchansk regiment was ordered to load up and move to new positions. The regiment has refused. I cannot conceive that the regiment (consists) completely of traitors. I hold the command personnel and commissars responsible for the shameful violation of discipline.

"I order the commanders of the regiment, the battalions, companies, platoons and teams to immediately get underway at the head of their units and follow instructions. If not all do so, then only good-for-nothings will remain. The honest will be awarded and the traitors executed. For executing this order in 24 hours I hold personally responsible the regimental commander Zakharov, the regimental commissar and all command personnel. They will all answer with their heads. **In 24 hours, all soldiers of the Volchansk regiment who do not carry out the order will be disarmed and the ring leaders will be executed and the remainder imprisoned until the end of military operations** (emphasis mine.—A.P.).

"7 October

"Chairman of the Revolutionary (Military) Council of the Republic, L. Trotsky."

Approximately the same content could be found in the orders from the chairman of the RVSR to the personnel of the Labor Front (Trudarmiya). As an example, let me quote an excerpt from Order No. 194 of 24 February 1920 to the 1st Labor Army: "...For nonfulfillment of the lesson, the command and commissar personnel is to be held responsible.

"Units who are negligent of their labor duties are to be converted to penal units, setting the harshest conditions for them. The special representative of the Soviet Labor Army is to establish on the spot the reasons for the poor course of work, arrest the most guilty persons and send them before the Revolutionary Tribunal of the Army....

"Chairman of the Revolutionary Soviet of the 1st Labor Army, Trotsky."²⁰

Nor did Trotsky forgive oversights in service by those who were close to him. Thus, the commandant of Trotsky's armored train (No. 1), Aleksey Popov, was removed from his position merely because to the question directed to him as to under what conditions the armored train had left Kazan, he had replied: "Thank God, no one killed and no one wounded."²¹ Another time the Red Armyman from the personal guard of the RVSR Chairman, Kozlov, was turned over to the court of the Military Tribunal. On what grounds this had been done one can learn from the following document:

Order To the Chief of the Train No. 256

"Today during a meeting with Comrades Rakovskiy and Frunze, standing at the office doors was Comrade Kozlov. The latter, that is, Kozlov, admitted an outsider to the meeting, without having requested my permission and without any information on the right of this person to participate in the meeting.

"I propose that Comrade Kozlov be remanded to the Revolutionary Military Tribunal²² and subjected to immediate arrest.

"RVSR Chairman Trotsky."²³

L.D. Trotsky also signed the following telegrams: "The Southern Front has remained without tea for an entire month," he telegraphed the Main Supply Chief Martynov. "Immediately send tea as well as matches. Inform us immediately of dispatch."²⁴ But here is how his own achievements were noted:

"Protocol No. 67 of a Session of the Presidium of the All-Union Central Executive Committee (VTsIK) of 20 November 1919 on Awarding the Chairman of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic, Comrade Trotsky, the Order of the Red Banner

"Comrade Lev Davydovich Trotsky, having assumed, upon assignment of the VTsIK, the task of organizing the Red Army, has shown in the work assigned to him

indefatigability and unabating energy. Brilliant results have crowned his enormous effort.

"Comrade Trotsky led the Red Army of Workers and Peasants not only from the center but inevitably shifted his work to those areas of the front where the task was most difficult, moving with constant cool-headedness and true courage along with the hero Red Armymen right into mortal danger.

"During the days of the direct threat to Red Petrograd, Comrade Trotsky, having left for the Petrograd Front, took close participation in organizing the brilliantly conducted defense of Petrograd and by his personal courage inspired the Red Army units on the front under combat fire. In commemoration of the accomplishments of Comrade L.D. Trotsky to the world proletarian revolution and the RSFSR RKKA, the VTsIK has decreed that L.D. Trotsky is to be awarded the Order of the Red Banner.

"Chairman of the VTsIK M.I. Kalinin.
"Secretary of the VTsIK [A.S.] Yenukidze."²⁵

At the following session of the VTsIK Presidium, I.V. Stalin was decorated.

"Protocol No. 68 of the session of the VTsIK Presidium of 27 March 1919. (Kalinin, Yenukidze, Nevskiy, Rykov, Smidovich).

"On the decorating of the member of the VTsIK Presidium and the member of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Southern Front, Comrade I.V. Stalin, with the Order of the Red Banner.

"During a time of mortal danger, when surrounded on all sides by a tight ring of enemies, Soviet power was repelling the enemy blows, at a time when the enemies of the worker-peasant revolution in July 1919 were approaching Krasnaya Gorka, at that difficult hour for Soviet Russia, Iosif Vissarionovich Dzhugashvili (Stalin) who had been appointed to the fighting post by the VTsIK Presidium by his energy and indefatigable work was able to rally the shaken ranks of the Red Army.

"Being himself in the area of the combat line, he under enemy fire by his personal example inspired the ranks of the fighters for Soviet Russia.

"In commemoration of all the accomplishments of defending Petrograd as well as for his unstinting further work on the Southern Front, the VTsIK has decreed that I.V. Dzhugashvili (Stalin) is to be awarded the Order of the Red Banner.

"Chairman of the VTsIK M.[I.] Kalinin
"Secretary A.[S.] Yenukidze."²⁶

L.D. Trotsky also received other decorations and gifts. For example, by a decision of the RVS [Revolutionary Military Council] of the Turkestan Front, Comrade Trotsky (a protocol of the session of 8 September 1920) on behalf of the All-Bukhara Revolutionary Committee

was awarded an honorary weapon, a "local-model saber."^{26a} But all of this did not soften the character of the RVS chairmen. His repressions extended not only to servicemen but also to their families. Proof would be one of the telegrams signed by Trotsky:

"Pokrovsk. Saratov Province. RVS.

"Is the fact of Lebedev's²⁷ betrayal completely ascertained? I request information on what measures have been taken against the deserter Lebedev. According to the issued order, I propose establishing the location of his family, it should be arrested and the arrest published.

"2 October 1918, No. 374/1955.
"RVS Chairman Trotsky."²⁸

One might compare this document with a telegram from V.I. Lenin to the Cherepovets Provincial Executive Committee sent on 29 March 1919:

Cherepovets. Provincial Executive Committee. Verify the complaint of Yefrosinya Andreyeva Yefimova, a female soldier in the village of Novoselo, Pokrovsk, Belozerskiy District concerning the confiscating of her grain for the common granary, although her husband has been a prisoner for 5 years and her family is three persons without employment. Inform me of the result of the check and your measures.

"SNK Chairman Lenin."²⁹

We offer to the readers one other previously unpublished document. This is the text of instructions by L.D. Trotsky transmitted over the direct wire: "Kremenchug. Staff of the 6th Composite Army. To Gorbunov, Tomachev. It is essential to immediately organize blocking detachments for the 6th Division using the most reliable soldiers with the addition of a certain number of communists. For this purpose, local communists are suitable. Without the blocking detachments it is impossible to establish order.

"8 August. No. 2530.
"RVS Chairman Trotsky, 1919."³⁰

In 1920, Trotsky signed Order No. 213 for their establishing (from 9 May for the commissar and command personnel of the Western Front). Point VII of this Order states:

"The organizing of the blocking detachments represents one of the most important tasks for the commanders and commissars. Each major troop formation should have behind it at least a delicate but strong and dependable network of blocking detachments which are controlled skillfully and on a centralized basis in accord with the operational assignments of the given troop formation.... A young soldier who endeavors to escape from the fire which he experiences for the first time should be met with a firm hand and which would strongly turn him back with the warning of the severe punishment for all violators of military duty. A bolting deserter should encounter a revolver or run up against a bayonet...."³¹

Here is, as they say, another line in the portrait, a story by one of those who was on the special train of Trotsky organized during the night from 7 to 8 August 1918. This occurred near Kazan, where our forces were weaker than those of the enemy Kappel who during the night of 29 August approached Sviyazhsk Station. "We had," wrote the eyewitness, "immediately available to the staff in a nearby area just one Petrograd worker regiment (600 men) which was very poorly trained and had never been in combat.... Our completely untrained transport drivers were victorious...regardless of the fact that the Petrograd worker regiment, having used up all its cartridges, fled from the position, rushed to the Volga, captured a steamer and began to demand that it be transported to Nizhniy.... Combat continued. But during this time upon Trotsky's orders under an enormous bluff down on the bank of the Volga, there was a court marshal and retribution...the field tribunal set up there sentenced one out of every ten to execution. Among those executed were communists, the commander and commissar of the regiment and others...."³²

We must not overlook the assertion that Trotsky played an important role in organizing the Red Army. In line with this, we would like to turn to the speech of V.I. Lenin "Everyone Into Food and Transport Work" (January, 1919) and where he directly stated who had actually played a major role in founding the army: "We (V.I. Lenin had in mind the members of the Central Executive Committee and the workers of the Soviet apparatus.— Author) created a strong foundation of the Red Army. We created this foundation by work in a new manner, by political propaganda on the front, by organizing the communists in our army, by unstinting organization and by the struggle of the finest persons of the worker masses."³⁴

No, it was not Trotsky's repressions and not his dictatorial actions which united the army ranks of the Red Army. No, it was not the military tribunals which reinforced military discipline in it and they worked, as they say, at full capacity.

On 28 March 1922, the Chairman of the RVSR L.D. Trotsky upon instructions of the Deputy Chairman of the Military Collegium of the Supreme Tribunal of the VTsIK, Sorokin, was provided with a table³⁵ (see the appended List).

List of Employing Supreme Measure of Punishment by RSFSR and Ukrainian Revolutionary Military Tribunals in 1921

Sentence to Execution	persons:
January	360
February	375
March	794
April	740
May	419
June	365

List of Employing Supreme Measure of Punishment by RSFSR and Ukrainian Revolutionary Military Tribunals in 1921 (Continued)

Sentence to Execution	persons:
July	393
August	295
September	176
October	122
November	111
December	187
TOTAL:	4,337

In addition to military organizational development, Trotsky was engaged even possibly to a greater degree in political activities.

The debate imposed by him on the party and directed against its Central Committee extended also into the Army, it distracted the command personnel from immediate work, it disrupted discipline and weakened the fighting capability of the Armed Forces. Trotsky endeavored in every possible way to remove the army and its headquarters bodies from under party control and above all from the Central Committee, and put the personnel of the People's Commissariat of Military and Naval Affairs in a special status.

Even at the Eighth Congress the resolution on the military question in the section "Practical Measures" stated: "The Eighth Congress of the RKP(b) instructs the party Central Committee to take measures immediately.... 2. For regulating the work of the RVSR;

"3. For systematizing the work of the All-Russian High Staff in line with the flaws in its activity (formation, publishing of regulations and so forth) and the necessity of strengthening the representation of the party in the All-Russian High Staff...."³⁶

During the years of peacetime construction of socialism, when a real opportunity arose for reducing the army and its fundamental reorganization, the RVS headed by Trotsky as well as the central military apparatus subordinate to him did not carry out the party decisions aimed at restructuring the armed forces in accord with the new conditions and raising their combat readiness.

A high-level commission of the RKP(b) Central Committee established on 14 March 1924 (commission chairman S.I. Gusev) to investigate the reasons for personnel turnover and the state of army supply, having thoroughly studied the state of affairs in the army, stated that in the form which the army was at present, it did not meet the demands made on it. In reporting on the results of the investigation of the military department, the chairman of the Central Committee commission S.I. Gusev pointed out: "In all our main directorates one feels the coercion of the old specialists and generals.... The RVS has not carried out a policy aimed at gradually removing the old specialists and putting in new workers

who have grown up during the years of the Civil War and who after the Civil War have been trained and are capable now of holding higher positions and handling matters better than the old specialists.... The first graduating class of the General Staff Academy³⁷ which has consisted of those workers and peasants who during the Civil War commanded our Red Army units and who upon the end of the war went off to study—this graduating class in its predominant majority has been demobilized from the Red Army.”³⁸

But this was later, in 1924, but in the extremely difficult times of the Civil War the People's Commissar of Military and Naval Affairs L.D. Trotsky in his special train turned up on various fronts, “establishing” discipline.

Footnotes

1. V.I. Lenin, PSS [Complete Collected Works], Vol 50, pp 352-353.

2. [Not in text]

3. V.I. Lenin, “O voyne, armii i voyennoy nauke” [On War, the Army and Military Science], Moscow, Voenizdat, Vol 2, 1957, p 337.

4. Ibid., p 376.

5. TsGASA [Central State Archives of the Soviet Army], folio 8, inv. 1, file 390, sheet 12 verso.

6. Ibid., folio 55, inv. 1, file 9, sheet 26.

7. Ibid., folio 33987, inv. 7, file 35, sheet 116.

8. L.D. Trotsky, “Moya zhizn,” p 92.

9. Ibid., p 141.

10. TsGASA, folio 33987, inv. 1, file 482, sheet 107.

11. N. Sayers, A. Kahn, “Taynaya voyna protiv Sovetskoy Rossii” [Taynaya voyna protiv Sovetskoy rossii] [The Secret War Against Russia], translated from the English, Moscow, Gosudarstvennoye Izd-vo Inostrannoy Literatury, 1974, pp 24-25.

12. Ibid., p 25.

13. Ibid.

14. TsGASA, folio 1, inv. 1, file 142, sheet 20.

15. V.I. Lenin, “Voyennaya perepiska 1917-1922” [Military Correspondence 1917-1922], Moscow, Voenizdat, 1987, p 58.

16. TsGASA, folio 1, inv. 1, file 142, sheet 63.

17. V.I. Lenin, “Voyennaya perepiska...,” p 155.

18. TsGASA, folio 1, inv. 1, file 142, sheet 78.

19. Ibid., sheet 94.

20. Ibid., folio 33987, inv. 1, file 329, sheet 12.

21. Ibid., folio 4, inv. 7, file 33, sheet 4.

22. The session of the Revolutionary Military Tribunal of the Kiev Military District was held on 21 September 1921 (in Kiev). It approved a decree on the trial of Comrade Kozlov for violating the Garrison Service Regulations for having admitted through the post Comrade Nikolayenko, the chairman of the Volyn Provincial Executive Committee in whose office the meeting was being held.

23. TsGASA, folio 33987, inv. 1, file 329, sheet 116.

24. Ibid., folio 1, inv. 1, file 142, sheet 115.

25. Ibid., folio 55, inv. 1, file 9, sheet 26.

26. Ibid., folio 55, inv. 1, file 9, sheet 30.

26a. Ibid., folio 33987, inv. 1, file 260, sheet 115.

27. It was not possible to establish who the deserter Lebedev was, what was his position in the army and at the same time the documentary evidence of the fact of his desertion.

28. TsGASA, folio 1, inv. 1, file 142, sheet 88.

29. V.I. Lenin, “Voyennaya perepiska...,” p 122.

30. TsGASA, folio 33987, inv. 1, file 229, sheet 27.

31. Ibid., file 329, sheets 47-48.

32. S.I. Gusev, “Grazhdanskaya voyna i Krasnaya Armiya: Sbornik voyenno-teoreticheskikh i voyenno-politicheskikh statey” [The Civil War and the Red Army: Collection of Military-Theoretical and Military-Political Articles], Moscow, Gosizdat, 1925, pp 17-20.

33. [Not in text]

34. V.I. Lenin, “O voyne, armii...,” Moscow, Voenizdat, Vol 2, 1957, p 359.

35. TsGASA, folio 33987, inv. 2, file 141, sheet 148-149.

36. “Vosmoy syezdz RKP(b). Mart 1919 g. Protokoly” [Eighth RKP(b) Congress. March 1919. Minutes], Moscow, 1959, p 422.

37. Presently the Military Academy imeni M.V. Frunze, but from 1921 through 1925, the RKKA Military Academy.

38. TsPA IML [Central Party Archives of the Marxism-Leninism Institute], folio 17, inv. 2, file 113, sheet 17.

(Conclusion follows)

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SCIENTIFIC PAPERS AND INFORMATION

Activities of Russian Army Historical Archives Described

904P0001E VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL
in Russian No 8, Aug 89 (signed to press 10 Aug 89
pp 72-74

[Article by A.V. Korotkov, director of the USSR Space
TsGVIA: "Repository of Documents of Russian Military
History"]

[Text] The Central State Military History Archives of the USSR (TsGVIA, No 3 Second Bauman Street, Moscow) store materials relating to the military history of Russia from the time of the founding of a regular army by Peter I until its disbanding in March 1918, with a total of over 13,000 folios which include around 3.3 million files. These documents contain extensive information on the state and development of the Russian Armed Forces, their organization and command, manning and combat training of the troops, the development of military equipment and weapons, logistic, military-medical and sanitary support, the organizing of military education and the indoctrination of the personnel, the activities of the various institutions and facilities of the military department as well as on outstanding Russian generals and military leaders. Here also are the original Ukases and letters of Peter I concerning the reorganization of the army, military laws, decrees, orders, regulations, manuals and instructions for all the arms of the ground forces and dating to the 18th up to the beginning of the 20th Centuries, materials on the carrying out of military reforms in the 1860s-1870s as well as the reorganization of the army in the period after the defeat in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905.

A major holding is comprised of documents on the history of wars and military operations involving Russia, beginning with the Azov Campaigns of Peter I and ending with World War I as well as materials showing the development of military art and military theoretical thought in Russia.

The activities of the Russian military institutions encompassed virtually all aspects of state and social life. For this reason, the materials of the USSR TsGVIA contain information on the economy and geography of the nation, the domestic and foreign policy of Tsarism and the Provisional Government, the history of the working class and peasantry, the class struggle, the revolutionary, sociopolitical and national liberation movements in the Russian Empire. The archives store handwritten and printed maps, atlases of the world in Russian and foreign languages, topographic, administrative, astronomical and other charts, military-statistical, geographic, topographic and economic descriptions of Russia by oblasts, krays, provinces, counties, regions under governor-generals and cities, hydrographic materials of the 17th to the beginning of the 20th Centuries.

There are also maps of cities, architectural-construction projects and drawings of various military and civilian buildings and structures in Moscow, St. Petersburg and other Russian cities. These were made by prominent Russian architects and are unique sources on the history of architecture and urban development. The archives possess numerous illustrative and artistic materials such as old engravings, various drawings and watercolors, including drawings of the uniforms and weapons of the combat arms of Russian and foreign armies as well as albums with views of Russian cities and photographs.

Along with ensuring the safekeeping of the documents, a most important area in the activities of the USSR TsGVIA is to organize their complete use. In Tsarist Russia, access to work with archival materials was extremely restricted. For this special permission was required from the defense ministry and sometimes from the emperor himself. Naturally, the subject of military history research was greatly narrowed. A significant place among these was held by works on the history of the troop units and military institutions. Troop historiographers who worked in the Military Scholarly Archives of the High Staff in 1890-1914 comprised over 50 percent of the researchers working there.¹

At present, the necessary conditions have been created at the USSR TsGVIA for the complete use of documents: there is a well-organized range of stored materials; developed scientific reference facilities (a guide, descriptions, catalogs and other references are available) making it possible to ascertain the composition and content of the documentary holdings; open access to the holdings and documents; scientific-procedural support for all types of work being carried out in the archives; the presence of skilled personnel.

The use of the documents has been organized by providing an information service for researchers working in the reading room, carrying out requests from state, military and social organizations and citizens on various questions, conducting excursions and organizing exhibits of archival materials, preparing radio and TV broadcasts as well as publishing documentary collections and articles.

The intensity of the use of the archival documents has been constantly rising. The volume of files handed out from the repositories has almost doubled over the last decade. The number of researchers working in the archives has been growing steadily. In 1980, 354 researchers were working in the reading room and in 1987, the figure was already 544. However, the richest source base of the USSR TsGVIA is still very little used. Each year, not more than 1.5-2 percent of the files out of the total number is requested. An enormous number of documents has not been put into scholarly circulation, many of them have never been brought out, and no one can say anything about their content. In the press, there at times are announcements about amazing findings made in the archives and there still are many interesting discoveries awaiting the researchers.

Unfortunately, many visitors to the TsGVIA request the documents and files of the same folios, individual files are requested constantly and they are more of the time in the reading room than in the repository. One of the reasons for such a situation is, in our view, the pragmatism and poor professional training of individual categories of historians who have lost their taste for working with archival documents. Often the researchers, more often students and graduate students, resort to the help of the archives only to verify the reliability of the references to documents in previously published works. Of course, this can only conditionally be called the use of the documents for scholarly purposes. As a result, the range of the problems covered by military history research has been narrowed and the completeness and depth of their study have been lost.

The subjects of the research being carried out on the documents of the USSR TsGVIA are extremely diverse. But as paradoxical as it may seem, the subjects of military history do not prevail in this. Moreover, over the last 30 years, these questions comprise 4th or 5th place among the others, giving way to such questions as "The Class Struggle," "The Sociopolitical Movement," "National Liberation Movement" and "Architecture and Urban Development." For example, in 1980-1985, the number of research studies on military history and the history of the Russian army equaled 997, that is, 18.7 percent of the total number of research projects, while on the questions of the class struggle, the sociopolitical and national liberation movements in Russia the figure was 2,214 (41.6 percent).

It is essential to emphasize that the number of military specialists and historians turning to the archival documents has been constantly declining. One gains the impression that Russian military history is being turned into an abandoned child of military history science and is being abandoned if not to dilettantes in any event to persons far removed from it in terms of the level of their professional training. As a result, there has been the emasculating of the problems covered by military history research and a depressing concern with petty questions has proliferated. Works have multiplied on extremely narrow, particular, very special questions which do not go beyond the private interests and sympathies of the researchers. Major problems are virtually not being worked on at all, although it would be difficult to assume that there is no need for this. The works written 20-25 years ago by the Soviet military historians P.A. Zayonchkovskiy, L.G. Beskrovnyy and P.A. Zhilin with all their importance and soundness are not either all-encompassing or indisputable. At present, individual ideas and conclusions in certain of them are noticeably out of date, they do not meet modern requirements and require clarification and supplementing.

The trend toward a decline in research on the military history of Russia to a certain degree reflects the alarming situation which has come to be in the training of specialists in this area. Not a single higher institution of learning in the nation trains these specialists. There is

not even a special course on Russian military history in the curriculums of the history faculties of the universities and pedagogical institutes. Only a small place has been assigned to military history questions in the plans of the scientific research work being done by scholarly organizations, including the History Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences. The Military History Institute of the USSR Ministry of Defense devotes its basic attention to working out the problems of the history of the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945, minimizing the questions of the prerevolutionary period. For the sake of justice, it must be said that with the arrival of new leadership in the institute, there has been a definite positive shift toward broadening this area of research. This question was discussed at a roundtable session held at the USSR TsGVIA in October 1988. Its participants unanimously favored the establishing of the previously lost creative ties and contacts with the archives in the area of working out the questions of military history on the basis of the documents stored there. Agreement was reached on the preparation of joint publications.

The negative attitude toward the archives on the part of numerous historians is explained by the fact that for a long time access to a number of categories of archival materials was restricted. And at present the thesis of the "restrictedness" of the archives continues by inertia to have a negative influence, although at present extensive work is being done by all the state archives, including the USSR TsGVIA, to lift all unnecessary restrictions and convert the documents to open use. For this reason, one of the important tasks of our archives is to actively propagandize and popularize the documents stored in it. In the aim of increasing public interest in them, documentary exhibits and excursions are being organized, information is being sent out to various institutions and organizations and certain documents are being published. Unfortunately, this work at times is being held up by objective factors. For example, the documentary exhibits being conducted by the USSR TsGVIA, as a rule, are of a local nature, they are exhibited in the archival building for a short period of time, and are viewed basically by just the researchers working in the reading room. The absence of special quarters for exhibits prevents many more specialists, fans of history and other desirous persons from becoming acquainted with them. At times, it is only in an exhibit that it is possible to show the original of unique and specially precious documents. The question of providing a special exhibit room and in the future of organizing a museum of the USSR TsGVIA continues to remain one of the urgent ones.

One other important area of work for the USSR TsGVIA is the publishing of the documents kept at it. This work began at the end of the 1930s, but the first documentary collections published in 1940-1941 were designed for a comparatively small range of military specialists. During the period of the Great Patriotic War, collections were prepared and published on the military past of the Russian Army in the aim of raising the patriotic spirit of

the Soviet troops and reminding them of how their ancestors fought and were victorious over foreign invaders. In 1944-1947, single-volume collections were published devoted to famous Russian generals such as A.V. Suvorov, M.I. Kutuzov, P.I. Bagration and P.A. Rumyantsev. Since 1948, the archives have begun preparing collections of a scientific type, the first of which was the collection "Semiletnyaya voyna" [The Seven Years War]. It took almost 10 years to publish collections from the series "Russkiye polkovodtsy" [Russian Military Leaders] and which included 12 books of documents of P.A. Rumyantsev, A.V. Suvorov and M.I. Kutuzov. Simultaneously, work was being done on publishing documents and materials on the subject "Aviation and Air Navigation in Russia in 1907-1914." This was completed in 1977. Published on the 150th anniversary of the 1812 Patriotic War were the collections "Narodnoye opolcheniye v Otechestvennoy voyne 1812 goda" [The People's Militia in the 1812 Patriotic War], "Borodino," "Listovki Otechestvennoy voyny 1812 goda" [Pamphlets of the 1812 Patriotic War] and "Pokhod russkoy armii protiv Napoleona v 1813 godu i osvobodzheniye Germanii" [The Campaign of the Russian Army Against Napoleon in 1813 and the Liberation of Germany]. Beginning in 1964, the archives have been preparing publications on the subject "The Army and Revolution." Already six collections have been published and this series will be completed with the collection "Russkaya armiya v 1917 godu" [The Russian Army in 1917] and work on this is continuing now. Great attention is being given to discovering and preparing materials on the friendly ties of the Russian people with the peoples of foreign nations. The documentary collections are the result of great scholarly work, they are supplied with extensive commentaries and historical and historiographic articles. They are widely employed for research as well as in mass agitation and training-educational work. The main publications prepared by the archives staff have been positively reviewed by the scholarly community and in the press.

At present, the USSR TsGVIA is confronted with the task of broadening the range of publications. Along with scientific collections of documents, there are plans to publish scientific popular works directed at the mass reader. These include memoirs, illustrated publications and albums, historical essays on Russian military figures and events in Russian military history. The archives have already begun to publish a series of albums on the subject "History of the Uniform of the Russian Army and Navy."

The USSR TsGVIA stores around 500 files of memoir sources, and these include diaries, memoirs and notes by prominent military leaders. These contain rich factual material on the life and military activities of the army as well as on everyday life and mores in the military milieu. Of significant interest are the memoirs dating to the period of the wars waged by Russia in the 19th and the beginning of the 20th Centuries. The most important and valuable in historical terms are the diaries and

memoirs of the last defense ministers of Tsarist Russia—A.N. Kuropatkin, A.F. Rediger and A.A. Polivanov; these had been published previously in small fragments.

In speaking about the prospects of work, one cannot help but mention the existing difficulties. The absence of an independent right to publish for the archives as well as a lack of a dependable printing facility and the necessary equipment substantially complicate their publishing activities. Many publications must literally feel their way, proving their timeliness, their future commercial success and success with the readers. Under the conditions of the converting of the publishing houses and editorial staffs to cost accounting, the latter is of important significance. All the same in publishing activities, the increasing demand for military history literature and the shortage of this are becoming the main guideline. For certain areas of Russian military history, such as, for example, phaleristics, uniformology, the history of Russian army regiments and so forth, the main literature is represented by prerevolutionary or foreign publications basically available to a small number of specialists. The periodical press, including the military, does not pay sufficient attention to Russian military history. The interest shown by the editors of VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in broadening the range of their articles is, in our view, an indication of the new times and the new thinking. This provides reason to hope that, in propagandizing military history knowledge, the journal will regularly take up the questions of Russian military history on its pages.

Footnote

1. TsGVIA SSSR [USSR Central State Military History Archives], folio 492, inv. 1, files 86, 95, 100, 105.

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Fiftieth Anniversary of VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL Celebrated

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pp 94-96

[Unattributed article: "Fifty Years of VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL"]

[Text] In August 1939, the first issue of VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL came out and its publishing had been organized on the basis of a decision of the VKP(b) [All-Union Communist Party (Bolshevik)] Central Committee of 29 April 1939. It opened with an editorial which set out the goal and main area for the journal's contents and then contained the following articles: on the defeat of the White Guard Army of A.V. Kolchak in 1919 and on the Swedish troops of King Charles XII in the Poltava Battle of 1709; on the storming of the Bastille by Parisian rebels marking the beginning of the Great French Revolution of 1789, with a detailed description of the Jacobins Program, the course of the fighting and the reasons for the defeat of

the rebels; on the continuing militarization of German policy and economy. The same issue under the heading "Heroes of the Civil War" contained articles about V.I. Chapayev and N.A. Shchors; under the heading "From Combat Experience" the last battle of the 11th Infantry Division in the Brusilov Offensive of 1916 was described; in the section "Documents From the Past" works were published by the military historian F.Ye. Ogorodnikov as well as reports on the jubilee ceremonies devoted to the 230th anniversary of the Battle of Poltava. Moreover, the journal published reviews and commentaries on works published in our country and abroad on military history as well as informative notes on what was happening on the historical front.

Subsequent issues published articles that were diverse in style and content, and new headings appeared such as: "Military Leaders of the Past" (On Russian Generals and Military Leaders), "Monuments of Antiquity," "The Calendar of Military Events" and others. Extensive and interesting materials were published from military history and the history of military art of the pre-Soviet period, the period of the Civil War and military intervention as well as the interwar period.

Over the almost 2-year period of its existence (a month after the start of the Great Patriotic War, the journal was combined with the journal VOYENNAYA MYSL) some 23 issues appeared and these contained over 400 materials, including: 41 on the general problems of military art, 66 on the history of the Civil War, 55 on the wars of the age of imperialism, 85 on the history of the Red Army, its combat arms, staffs and military equipment, and of the documents dealing with the past, 56 on the heroism of Russian soldiers and 59 from the history of international relations, the national liberation revolutionary movement and democratic uprisings. Also published were articles and essays on the talented military leaders such as B.M. Khmel'nitskiy, P.A. Rumyantsev-Zadunayskiy, A.V. Suvorov, M.I. Kutuzov, P.I. Bagration, M.I. Platov; on the Civil War heroes, V.I. Chapayev, G.I. Kotovskiy, N.A. Shchors, A.Ya. Parkhomenko, S.G. Lazo and others; on the German military theorists A. Gneisenau, G. Scharnhorst and K. Clausewitz. The last issue was published as a combined one (No 6-7) and was devoted completely to the start of the Great Patriotic War. Its materials reminded the readers of the heroic past of our motherland, and urged the Soviet military to fight the enemy steadfastly and courageously and defend each inch of our fatherland with dignity and honor, as had been done by their predecessors in the times of Aleksandr Nevskiy, Dmitriy Donskoy, Kuzma Minin and Dmitriy Pozharskiy, Aleksandr Suvorov and Mikhail Kutuzov.

The publishing of the journal was resumed upon a decision of the CPSU Central Committee in January 1959. Over the period since, its pages have published many articles the authors of which were immediate participants in the Great Patriotic War, prominent Soviet military leaders as well as commanders of the fronts, armies, corps and divisions on the battlefields.

Their recollections of the strategic, front and army operations which they organized, led and carried out at present comprise a true treasure trove of military history science. During those years the journal published the memoirs of virtually all the marshals of the Soviet Union, the chief marshals artillery, armored troops and aviation, the fleet admirals, army generals, marshals of the combat arms and Armed Services and admirals.

The journal dealt systematically with the history of the wars of Tsarist Russia and which brought forth the military talent and leadership skill of B.P. Sheremetev, A.D. Menshikov, F.F. Ushakov, P.S. Nakhimov, A.P. Rumyantsev-Zadunayskiy, A.V. Suvorov, M.I. Kutuzov and many other army and navy leaders the names of whom have been inscribed in gold letters in domestic military history. Materials were provided on the essence and content of the military reforms carried out during and after the defeat of Russia in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905 as well as in the RKKA [Worker-Peasant Red Army] after the end of the Civil War in 1924-1928. It is essential to point out that the publications of that period were chiefly based on military history works published in the 1930s through the 1970s when the censor restrictions during the cult of personality and stagnation limited a correct depiction of certain events not only in Soviet military history but also the military history of the pre-Soviet period, with access of researchers to the archival documents being extremely limited and simply closed for some.

The 27th CPSU Congress obliged the mass information media to oppose the resourcefulness and unprincipledness of the bourgeois propagandists "with high professionalism by our ideological workers, the morality of socialist society, its culture, openness to information, and by the bold and creative nature of our propaganda. There must be aggressiveness and this concerns the unmasking of ideological subversion as well as providing truthful information about the real accomplishments of socialism and the socialist way of life" ("Materialy XXVII syezda KPSS" [Materials of the 27th CPSU Congress], Moscow, Politizdat, 1986, p 88). In carrying out these and other instructions of the CPSU Central Committee, the editors in a planned manner have reorganized their work toward greater objectivity, reliability and truthfulness of each publication. The contents of the articles, comments and scientific papers has been based chiefly upon archival documents previously unpublished. Preference has been given to those materials which touch upon previously "prohibited" subjects and have dealt with the "blank spots" of military history. As an example, let us take the major question of the military setbacks of the Soviet Armed Forces in the initial period of the Great Patriotic War, when in a short period of time the Nazi troops were able to seize a large portion of the territory of the Soviet state. An examination of the reasons for the defeat of the Soviet troops during this period was commenced by publishing as a point of departure for discussion the article by Lt Gen M.M. Kiryan entitled "The Initial Period of the Great Patriotic

War" found in issue No 6 of 1986. In developing the ideas touched upon in it we have published materials on the actions of the troops in the initial period of the war on the Northwestern (No 7) and Southwestern sectors (No 8) and excerpts from the book by L.M. Sandalov "Boyevyye deystviya voysk 4-y armii v nachalnyy period Velikoy Otechestvennoy voyny" [Combat Operations of the 4th Army in the Initial Period of the Great Patriotic War] (Nos 10, 11, 12 for 1988, 2 and 6 for 1989), all of which examined the situation at that time on the front. The given question was also the subject of the publishing of supplements to the book by K.K. Rokossovskiy "Soldatskiy dolg" [A Soldier's Duty] which had been abridged or removed for various reasons in the process of preparing the book for printing. Publications on the given question are continuing.

Also directly related to the difficult period of our military history is the question of the mass repression of military personnel on the eve of the war as this was one of the reasons for the poor preparedness of the Soviet troops for military operations. This has been taken up in detail in the article by Doctor of Historical Sciences, Prof I.I. Kuznetsov "Generals of 1940" (No 10, 1988). Also devoted to a partial disclosure of the setbacks of the initial period of the war are the comments by the military historian, Lt Gen (Ret) N.G. Pavlenko "Reflections on the Fate of a Military Leader" (Nos 10, 11, 12, 1988) and the notes on the biography of G.K. Zhukov by the writer Konstantin Simonov published in Nos 6, 7, 9, 10 and 12 for 1987.

Enormous interest has been aroused among the readers by the materials published under the heading "Documents and Materials" begun in issue No 8 for 1988. Here we have published the long classified Order of the USSR People's Commissar of Defense No 227 of 28 June 1942 known in the people as Stalin's Order "Not One Step Back," the Order of Headquarters Supreme High Command of the Red Army No 270 of 1941 (No 9, 1988), the Order of the NKO [People's Commissariat of Defense] No 0391 of 4 October 1941 "On Facts of Replacing Educational Work by Repressions" and the Directive of the Chief of the RKKa GlavPU [Main Political Directorate] No 268 of 7 December 1941 "On Eliminating Neglect in Oral Propaganda and Agitation" (No 9, 1988). The readers write that these documents have made it possible to profoundly understand the very difficult situation on the Soviet-German Front at that time and what dictated the harshness and even the cruelty of the demands of the Supreme High Command on all soldiers, sergeants, officers and generals and the need to put an end to the indifference, negligence and irresponsibility for the fate of the fatherland.

Reader attention has also been drawn to the publications which have lifted the curtain of silence on the family of I.V. Stalin: his son Yakov Dzhugashvili (No 12, 1988), the son Vasilii and the daughter Svetlana Alliluyeva (Nos 3 and 4, 1989). There has also been interest in the articles under the heading "The Age in Autobiographies," begun in No 12 of last year. This has already

published autobiographies taken from the archives of personal files of prominent Soviet military leaders as well as officers and commanders and particularly interesting persons whose names are widely known in the people: D.M. Karbyshev and I.I. Vatselis (No 12, 1988), I.V. Panfilov and I.V. Boldin (No 1), I.P. Uborevich (No 2), A.I. Sedyakin and M.M. Raskova (No 3), O.I. Goro-dovikov and S.M. Pugachev (No 4, 1989). The publishing of autobiographies is continuing.

In widely publishing materials which have been forgotten or were previously banned for publication, the editors became interested in what the situation was with glasnost in the military department of Tsarist Russia. We have uncovered documents and articles in the periodical press from the previous century. Excerpts from one such article were found in the April issue for this year: "In Our Russia We Need Glasnost More Than Anywhere Else...."

An absolute majority of the readers has warmly welcomed the article by the Soviet writer Kareem Rash "The Army and Culture." In analyzing the history of the genesis and development of the Russian and Soviet Armies, the author writes: "The army is worthy of the most profound respect for the fact that it was always the first to respond to any disaster, be it a fire or flood, and for the fact that the officers, in serving the fatherland, at times were deprived of not only theaters and libraries but also many pleasures which were taken for granted by a majority of us. The army will always have enemies, and we must not lull ourselves into complacency. The army stands on discipline and this is intolerable to the slovenly. The army is founded on labor and this is not to the liking of the idlers and parasites."

The problems of military discipline hold a special place on the pages of the journal and these have been examined from the standpoint of the historical tradition and succession. "To stand to the death for the brother and father, for the fatherland was an unwritten law. The Russian soldier was ready for self-sacrifice and a helping hand, and considered capture a disgrace for himself," states the article by Yu.F. Sokolov "Heed the Wise...(On Troop Discipline in Ancient Russia)" published in issue No 11, 1988. Confirmation of these words is the examples and facts given in the article taken from the campaigns of Prince Svyatoslav of Kiev against the Byzantine Army in 968-971, Yaroslav Mudryy and Vladimir Monomakh, Prince Igor Svyatslavovich of Seversk, Prince Dmitriy Ivanovich Donskoy of Moscow and others. An acute feeling of military honor and duty always united the men at a moment of serious danger. A word of honor was highly regarded in Ancient Russia. Violators of it were expelled from the territory of the clan, community or tribe.

Instructive and interesting are the thoughts of the generals and officers of the Russian Army on the questions of the dealings of superiors with subordinates, on the moral qualities of an officer, on discipline and the feeling of duty, on the independence of superiors (No 10, 1988),

on a respectful attitude toward the soldier and the self-education of an officer (No 3, 1989), and brought together under a single title "On Education and Training in the Russian Army." The ideas voiced by them on military discipline and the relationships between officers and subordinates up to the present have not lost their importance and force. A continuation of this subject is the article by A.M. Kolesnikov "M.I. Dragomirov on Military Discipline" (No 6, 1989) and this discloses the essence, the areas and methods of work of officers in educating soldiers and strengthening discipline and these have a contemporary ring.

An analysis of military discipline in the Soviet Army, the work of the army party and Komsomol organizations in the 1930s and on the eve of the Great Patriotic War were the subject of three articles by O.F. Suvenirov: "If There Had Not Been That Bacchanalia," "An All-Army Tragedy" and "We Will Not Cancel the Order" which were published in three issues (2, 3, and 4) of the journal for this year and linked together by the single heading "Military Discipline: Lessons of History." Their content was reinforced by appropriate documents: "Materials on the Minutes of a Session of the Military Council of the Kiev Military District" No 2 of 26 March 1938 and from the decree of the military council of this district "On the State of the Command, Superior and Political Personnel of the District" (No 3, 1989).

As a whole, the articles on military discipline, like the materials on other problems are aimed at "assessing the past with a feeling of historical responsibility and on the basis of historical truth...to pay proper due to all the heroic in our past and draw lessons from the errors and mistakes (M.S. Gorbachev, "October and Perestroika: The Revolution Continues," PRAVDA, 2 November 1987).

This year, the editors have begun providing four pages of a color insert and these have run since No 2. A predominant majority of the drawings and photographs are of an informative nature, they show military monuments, the uniforms of the regiments of the Russian Army and the troops of its enemies against whom they had to fight at different times, beginning with the 13th Century.

The editors are continuing to seek out and publish materials on little-known, half-forgotten pages of our military history. In it, in history, lie our roots, the roots of today. History is a school for our life and it is the very

air which we breathe, and to restore the truth to it is a concern of every honest man.

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Articles Not Translated from VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL No 8, 1989

00000000 Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 8, Aug 89 (signed to press 10 Aug 89 p 1

[Text]The First Days of the War in Documents (Unattributed)pp 30-31

Thirteen Days in August 1939 (V.I. Pribylov) .pp 32-40

On Certain Contradictions in the Comments of Academician A.M. Samsonov (S.I. Azaryev)pp 41-43

Mikhail Fedorovich Lukin (Autobiography) ...pp 44-45

You Ask—We Reply (Unattributed)pp 63-64

In the Service of Evil (Yu.P. Markin)pp 65-66

The Case of Procurator Syslov (L.M. Zayka) ..pp 67-71

Charity (A.A. Litvin, N.I. Gordeyeva)pp 75-83

Our Heritage (M.S. Martynova-Savchenko)pp 84-87

Why I Was Remanded to the Court and Condemned (Ye.I. Martynov)pp 87-93

They Write to Uspp 40, 96

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